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INTRODUCTION

Vast numbers of people require unreciprocated assistance from
others in order to enjoy a minimally decent life.' Dependency is
endemic to the human condition,2 touching everyone for at least
part of the life cycle. 3 Its causes are heterogeneous,' but its manifestations are always expensive.5 How should the costs be distributed?
1. Such people are "dependent," in the sense in which I will use the term in this Article.
Differing definitions make precise estimates of dependency rates problematic, but a
significant proportion of the population would be considered dependent on any reasonable
definition. See, e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality, in
FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF 219, 227 (Diana Tietiens Meyers ed., 1997) (relating that some
estimates suggest "as many as one-third of the people in the United States are dependent").
The shorthand formulation given in the text raises at least two sets of definitional questions.
The first of these involves the meaning of "require unreciprocated assistance," and will be
addressed in some detail below. See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text. The second
involves the meaning of a "minimally decent life." I will not attempt to address the second set
of questions here, except to note that a minimally decent life would be one in which the most
basic physiological and psychological needs usually associated with a fully human existence
are met. See JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 250-52
(1993) (discussing two different conceptions of a "social minimum").
2. E.g., EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY AND
DEPENDENCY 1, 29-30 (1999) (discussing diverse manifestations of dependence and the
centrality of them to human life); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 1-4 (1999).
3. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 35 (2004) (observing that
everyone is dependent during childhood and many people are dependent at other times as
well); Kittay, supra note 1, at 221 (observing that "[a]ll of us are dependent in childhood; most
of us are dependent in old age; and many of us are dependent for long periods of time
(sometimes throughout a life) because of ill health").
4. Dependence can arise from developmental, physical, mental, economic, or situational
factors-including the burden of providing unremunerated dependence care to others. See,
e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TwENrlr
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 8 (1995) (discussing the "derivative dependency' of
caretakers who must look to others for resources).
5. Demographic patterns are likely to drive these costs up in coming years. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 35 tbls.2.1, 2.2 (1995) (presenting statistics on
growth over time of older population segments in America). Even though medical advances
have "reduced the prevalence of disability and hence dependency among the old," id. at 46,
many older people will require medical care or daily assistance at some point. See, e.g.,
NADINE F. MARKS & JAMES D. LAMBERT, FAMILY CAREGrVING: CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND
ISSUES (Ctr. for Demography and Ecology, Univ. ofWisconsin-Madison, NSFH Working Paper
No. 78, 1997), available at http-J/www.ssc.wisc.edu/Cde/nsfhwptnsfh78.pdf (explaining that
greater life expectancy has brought with it "the greater likelihood that persons will live to
ages where more long-term chronic illnesses and health conditions occur" and observing that
many of the currently leading causes of death "often include an extended period of disability
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No domestic policy question of our time carries higher stakes or
triggers more divisive public discourse.
One significant axis of controversy concerns the appropriate
respective roles of the family and the state-society acting
collectively-in bearing dependency burdens.6 The modem welfare
state serves some of the purposes that family units and larger
voluntary social networks have served historically: insuring
individuals against risk, smoothing fortunes over the life cycle, and
providing for those who are not capable of self support. 7 Yet,
families continue to bear much of the burden associated with
dependency.8 Whether the role offamilies should expand or continue
to shrink is a subject of much debate. The large and diverse body of
scholarship on this topic resists simple generalizations, 9 but both
and need for caregiving before death") (citations omitted).
6. In this Article, I will use the terms "the state" and "society" interchangeably to refer
to institutional collective action at any level of government. Individuals also often have the
capacity, through the use of capital markets and products such as insurance, to bear some or
all of their own dependency costs, or to undertake actions that will reduce the likelihood or
severity of dependence. Although my primary focus in this Article is on the relative
responsibility assigned to families and to society, the role of individual control will surface
repeatedly.
7. See, e.g., NANCY FoLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KiDS? 108 (1994) (describing social
support systems provided by hunting and gathering tribes and by patriarchal families); MARY
ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw 294 (1989) (noting that while "families
have always shared their functions with other social institutions," in the twentieth century
these function-sharing institutions tended to be "distant bureaucratic entities-large school
systems, social welfare agencies, and so forth-rather than neighbors, patrons, and the local
school or parish").
8. See, e.g., KAREN I. FREDRIKSEN-GOLDSEN & ANDREW E. SCHARLACH, FAMILIES AND
WORm NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (2001) (reporting that more than

one in seven adults is involved in caring for ill or disabled friends or relatives, and that eightyfive percent of the care provided to the disabled elderly is provided informally and without pay
by family members and others); Nadine F. Marks, CaregivingAcross the Lifespan: National
Prevalenceand Predictors,45 FAM. REL. 27,30 tbl.1 (1996) (presenting 1987-88 data from the
National Survey of Families and Households showing that nearly 18% of women and 14% of
men had provided in-home care to a disabled or chronically ill person during the twelve
months preceding the survey); see also GLENDON, supra note 7, at 306 ("Even in advanced
welfare states, families at all income levels are a major resource for government, sharing the
burdens of dependency with public agencies in various ways and to greater or lesser
degrees.").
9. Much of the scholarship offers deeply contextual explorations of the arrangements
that societies-our own and others-have made for addressing particular manifestations of
dependence. See, e.g., Christa Bracci, Ties That Bind: Ontario'sFilialResponsibility Law, 17
CAN. J. FAM. L. 455 (2000); Francis H. Foster, Linking Supportand Inheritance:A New Model
from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199; Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the
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those who favor a larger cost-bearing role for the family and those
who favor a larger cost-bearing role for the state tend to give
insufficient attention to three crucial facets of society's costallocation problem. By engaging these shortcomings, this Article
illuminates underappreciated features of the dependence allocation
task, and takes some tentative steps towards outlining a policy
agenda that accounts for them.
First, society's feasible choice set does not comprise an unlimited
spectrum that runs from the extreme of no dependence assistance
at all to the other extreme of completely socialized assistance. In
fact, because unaddressed dependence is extremely costly to society
as a whole, society has committed itself to provide at least a
minimal level of public support for dependents who lack personal or
familial resources. 10 The conventional tack of evaluating policy
interventions against an implicit baseline of complete nonintervention misapprehends the nature of society's choice. Moreover, recognizing that society will serve at least a gap-filling function in addressing dependence leads to radically different policy prescriptions than
those that might follow from an inquiry that assumes all options lie
open.
Second, and closely related, dependence costs left to fall on
families will not necessarily come to rest upon families." Current
and potential family members have at their disposal a number of
United States: Who Should Pay for Mom and Dad?, in AGING: CARING FOR OuR ELDERS 65
(David N. Weisstub et al. eds., 2001); Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent
Parents:IntergenerationalResponsibilitiesin InternationalPerspective, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 401
(2002); Art Lee, Note and Comment, Singapore'sMaintenance of ParentsAct: A Lesson To Be
Learnedfrom the United States, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.. REV. 671 (1995).
10. See Amy L. Wax, Disability,Reciprocity, and "RealEfficiency": A Unified Approach,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1428 (2003) (observing that society guarantees "basic
subsistence on the condition that individuals make a reasonable effort to minimize the
assistance needed through self-help efforts"). While my primary focus in this Article is on the
impact of the societal "fall back" in shortening the feasible spectrum, societal reactions to cost
bearing can also truncate the "fully socialized" end of the spectrum.
11. The same is true of costs nominally placed on individuals, where society cannot
believably precommit to withholding assistance in the event the individual fails to bear those
costs appropriately. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive
Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 235,259-60. My focus here, however, will

be on families, based on the assumption that dependent persons are, at least at the moment
of dependence, unable to bear costs except in the unproductive and socially costly form of
unmitigated suffering.
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strategies designed to reduce their exposure to dependence costs.
These strategies produce results ranging from desirable cost
reductions to costly deadweight losses. A high-profile example of
costly family strategizing is the "Medicaid divorce" undertaken to
qualify a dependent spouse for publicly funded, means-tested
benefits. 2 Such cost-shifting techniques carry the potential to alter
not only the final distribution of the costs, but also the total costs
involved, and hence the efficiency of the arrangement. Yet, costshifting strategies are usually treated as isolated epiphenomena to
be attacked in situ, rather than as symptoms of an overarching set
of interactions between families and society that should globally
influence our thinking about arrangements for dependence care. As
a result, they have received relatively little sustained or systematic
theoretical attention.
Third, the true impact of dependence burdens on families turns,
in part, on the ability of families to spread costs temporally, or to
pool the risks that give rise to them. Risk exposure and periods of
illiquidity can lead to suboptimal investments in human capital,
yielding results that are both distributionally problematic and
inefficient. The question of access to financial products capable of
spreading costs temporally and pooling risks, however, is often
conflated in policy discussions with the question of who should pay
for those financial products. Although linked in often complex ways,
these issues can be separated, as the existence of private, marketbased financial products designed to address liquidity shortfalls and
risk attests. Where market products are unavailable, as is generally
the case where the asset in need of protection and timely investment
is human capital, policy interventions could focus on making
appropriate products available rather than on directly altering the
12. See, e.g., Michael Farley, Note, When 'I Do"Becomes "IDon't' Eliminatingthe Divorce
Loophole to Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER LJ. 27 (2001); Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Get a
Divorce, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 28, 2002 at 14 (responding to the query of an individual
considering a Medicaid divorce); infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Medicaid
eligibility rules that create this dilemma). The disutility that the couple suffers from
strategically divorcing and the costs it incurs in carrying out that plan represent deadweight
losses. The couple is made worse off by the behavioral distortion, but society as a whole is
made no better off as a result of their actions. Indeed, society is also arguably made worse off,
if we think that marriage is an institution with positive societal spillovers aside from the
spouses' assumption of dependence burdens.
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allocation of the costs of dependency.' 3 The desirability of such
alternatives depends on their relative performance in harnessing
the useful elements of familial strategies while limiting the more
destructive manifestations of family strategizing.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I frames society's cost
allocation problem. Of central importance is the convergence of
societal and familial interests on the goal of appropriately addressing dependence. This convergence has the effect of limiting the
feasible spectrum of policy choices. When coupled with often
divergent interests about cost bearing, it sets the stage for strategic
interactions between families and society as each attempts to bluff
the other into bearing a larger share of dependency care costs. Part
II details the strategies that families might employ in their
attempts to reduce dependency exposure. Part III shows how this
analysis generates a more useful way of approaching the question
of distributing dependence burdens.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

This Part examines the nature of society's cost allocation task
and the constraints it faces in making allocation choices. Part L.A
discusses some possible meanings of "dependence" and arrives at a
working definition capable ofmeaningfully guiding our inquiry. Part
I.B discusses two criteria that typically inform a society's choice
about allocating dependency burdens--distributive justice and
allocative efficiency. Part I.C sets out the ingredients of the strategic
dynamic that society faces in assigning dependent care costs and
explores how this dynamic restricts the feasible spectrum of policy
13. Both forced savings and mandatory insurance have received considerable attention
as policy instruments. However, other possibilities have been relatively neglected. For
example, the possibility of using government loans to address dependence-related liquidity
shortfalls and facilitate timely human capital investments has received little attention,
despite a general recognition that capital markets do not operate adequately in this arena.
See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL 93 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining that "it is difficult to
borrow funds to invest in human capital because such capital cannot be offered as collateral");
SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN 174-75 (1997) (noting

families' lack of access to investment capital and the desirability of moving to a model in
which they would be viewed more like small businesses); Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on
Poverty and Failurein the Market for Children'sHuman Capital,81 GEO. L.J. 1945,1948 n. 15
(1993) (collecting sources discussing these market imperfections).
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choices. Part I.D illustrates how this restricted spectrum suggests
very different policy approaches than those generated under the
assumption that any and all cost assignments are feasible.
A. Defining Dependency
The first task is to specify with some precision what dependence
means in the context of this Article's analysis. I have already
suggested that a dependent person is someone who requires
unreciprocated assistance in order to lead a minimally decent life,
but I have not yet fleshed out what I mean by "requires" and
"unreciprocated" and "assistance." By doing so here, I distinguish
the meaning of dependence I employ from broader and narrower
meanings that the term might plausibly be given. Defining dependence is often an ideologically charged exercise. Moreover, a society's
legal, cultural, and institutional features set the background
conditions against which the notion of dependence is constructed. 4
My objective here is not to take sides in ideological debates or to
state what "is" and "is not" dependence for all times and purposes.
Instead, I seek to arrive at a workable definition that fits with broad
societal intuitions and that represents a meaningful category for
which cost allocations are open to ongoing, broad-based debate. Only
by using such a definition can the analysis developed here have
meaningful traction for law and policy.
To start, consider how we might best construe the idea of
assistance.None of us is truly self-sufficient."5 A healthy, workingage person with plenty of marketable skills and no disabilities is
still incapable of single-handedly constructing, concocting, and
cultivating all of the things necessary for a minimally decent life,
while simultaneously protecting those things from theft and
14. See KrrrAY, supra note 2, at 29-30 (observing that while dependence is inherent to

human existence, cultural and other factors help set its precise parameters).
15. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, CrackingtheFoundationalMyths:Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoLY & L. 13, 22-23 (2000)
(observing that "[iFn complex modem societies no one is self-sufficient, either economically or
socially"); Robert E. Goodin, Social Welfare as a Collective Social Responsibility, in SOCIAL
WELFARE AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 133-34 (David Schmidtz & Robert E. Goodin

eds., 1998) (observing that everyone must rely on other people and institutions, as well as
natural laws, in order to survive).
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destruction. 6 Thus, what is generally regarded as "dependence" in
America relates only to those needs for outside assistance that arise
within a societal framework featuring a well-developed market
economy and governmental institutions capable of reliably protecting resources. Those arrangements, themselves quite costly, 7 are
essential in constructing the condition we think of as "independence."
This line of reasoning presents a plausible case for viewing
everyone as dependent in some sense, but such an expansive view
of dependence is not very useful for present purposes. Society has
already chosen to spread the costs associated with maintaining our
particular form of social order throughout society, rather than to
concentrate those costs on individuals, families, or other voluntary
social networks. That fundamental decision is so firmly rooted in
our system of government as to represent a fixed and immobile
feature of our social structure, part of the background against which
any policy-oriented vision of dependence must be constructed. If we
wish to make our definition of dependence narrow enough to
helpfully guide an inquiry into legal and policy choices, we cannot
count as dependent those who receive assistance through familiar
societal features such as the protection of property, the enforcement
of contracts, and the regulation of markets. Nevertheless, it is worth
underscoring that society never writes on a blank slate when it
makes decisions about allocating the costs of dependence. Recognizing the costly assistance that society already provides to those we
deem independent or self-sufficient becomes especially important
when the distributive justice of a particular arrangement is
considered.
On the definition applied here, the assistance that a dependent
person requires must not only fall outside of the ordinary course of
societal business, but must also be unreciprocated. Persons who
require assistance, but who are able to pay for that assistance in
some fashion are not "dependent" on this definition. This proviso
16. Even Robinson Crusoe, the most well-known literary approximation of this ideal, was
protected by his geographic isolation from many of the usual threats to individual resources.
17. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SuNsTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERrY
DEPENDS ON TAXEs 59-76 (1999); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:
TAXES AND JUSTICE 16-17 (2002).
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removes from the ranks of the dependent those who are interdependent on others by virtue of the specialization of labor."8 By and
large, people in modern industrialized societies do not produce
the items that are necessary to a minimally decent life, but rather
obtain them through trade or other reciprocal interactions. For
example,alawyer who owns no livestock or gardens and knows nothing about butchering, milking, or cultivating can obtain sustenance
by trading dollars for food. The lawyer is indeed dependent on the
other market actors for her dinner, but the other market actors are
similarly dependent on things that the lawyer's money can buy. The
interaction is reciprocal and mutually beneficial, and the specialization that brings it about creates wealth.19
Similar divisions of labor can also occur within households. ° A
couple might decide that one spouse will perform childcare and
other in-home work, while the other spouse devotes himself to work
in the marketplace. The market-earning spouse would then provide
part of his salary to the stay-at-home spouse as compensation for
the services provided in the home. The stay-at-home spouse in this
example is receiving financial assistance from the market-earning
spouse, but the assistance is not unreciprocated. Instead, the stayat-home spouse is providing services in the informal household
market. She is therefore not "dependent" in the sense in which I am
using the term here.21

18. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights II: The CompetitionBetween
Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 653, 672 (2002) (discussing 'the
dependency that comes with specialization"); see also Amy L. Wax, Social Welfare, Human
Dignity, and the Puzzle of What We Owe Each Other, 27 MARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY
(forthcoming), availableat http'//ssrn.com/abstract_id=478561 (using the notion of reciprocity
to counter arguments suggesting that all people are comparably dependent on others).
19. Demsetz, supra note 18, at 672 (noting that specialization generates wealth even as
it creates risk).
20. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior,
101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 397 (1993) (discussing possible gains from the division of labor within
marriage).
21. However, the stay-at-home spouse might easily become dependent if her marital
partnership ends and if no outside market exists for the services she is providing in the
household. It is also quite possible that the resources the stay-at-home spouse receives from
the market-earning spouse do not fairly reflect her contributions to the familial enterprise.
See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing intrafamilial power structures and the
possibility of intrafamilial cost-shifting).
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An additional refinement involves placing constraints on the
notion of reciprocation. When an adult child provides care to an
elderly parent who provided him with care some fifty years
earlier, should the two instances of caregiving be viewed in isolation
as spells of dependence, or taken together as a single reciprocal
interaction? When a widow who had cared for an ailing spouse
during the last ten years of his life becomes ill herself and receives
assistance from that spouse's sibling, should we view her as dependent, or as on the receiving end of a reciprocal interaction? Can
either of these cases be meaningfully distinguished from that of a
man who pays taxes his entire life and becomes seriously disabled
in his old age, without ever having had the occasion to personally
assist any other person? In all three situations, a strong case can
be made that the apparently dependent person is actually a
participant in a broadly-framed reciprocal interaction. However,
an unconstrained view of reciprocity makes the category of
"unreciprocated assistance"-our touchstone for dependenceunduly narrow and prohibitively unwieldy to apply.22 The shorthand
formulation of "unreciprocated assistance" thus requires the
following clarifying gloss: that the assistance must be part of an
ongoing reciprocal exchange between the parties. On this definition,
all three of the people described above would clearly qualify as
dependent.
Finally, consider what it means to say that someone requires
unreciprocated assistance in order to enjoy a minimally decent life.
By using this wording, I mean to confine the class of dependents
under discussion here to those who have no present choice about
their dependency. The fact that an individual has no present choice
about her dependence does not rule out the possibility that her past
choices may have influenced her present dependency, nor does it
rule out the possibility that her current or future choices might
affect the persistence or path of her dependency. My definition
22. If a completely unconstrained view of reciprocation were adopted, only those few
individuals who go through their entire lives without contributing either in cash or in kind
to the assistance of anyone else would be candidates for dependency. Such a definition would
plainly omit the vast majority of people who require assistance. It would also be impossible
to apply such a broad reciprocation test. One could not say for certain whether an instance
of assistance was truly unreciprocated until the assisted person's death extinguished all
chances for reciprocation.
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therefore encompasses dependency that stems from a lack of
marketable skills and similar forms of preventable economic
disadvantage, as well as that which stems from disabilities,
illnesses, childhood, or old age. By specifying that the dependency
at issue is presently involuntary, we can establish that some outside
assistance is now needed to enable the dependent person to enjoy a
minimally decent life. This permits us to focus exclusively on how
costs might best be allocated between the two societal institutions
that are most likely to provide assistance-the family and the state.
B. Distributionand Efficiency
Two normative criteria feature prominently in most discussions
about dependence cost allocations: efficiency' and distributive
justice.2 4 Efficiency, as applied here, involves minimizing the overall
cost of dependence and its treatment throughout society. Distributive justice relates to the fairness of the distribution among
members of society of the cost of dependence and its treatment. The
distinction between these two types of normative goals is easiest to
see if we compare two phenomena that are often confused in
discussions of dependence: cost shifting and cost reduction.
Commentators often assert that placing dependence costs on the
family "saves money" or is "efficient."2 5 It is certainly true and
23. The term "efficiency" has more than one meaning. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-16 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
varieties of efficiency).
24. There are, of course, many theories of distributive justice, including theories based on
efficiency criteria. When I invoke distributive considerations here, I mean to reference a set
of additional normative criteria that includes factors such as desert, greater equality in
opportunities or resources, and intergenerational and gender equity. Such considerations
could be accommodated within a sufficiently broad efficiency analysis based on people's
preferences for them or for the results they produce. However, the point of considering them
separately is to suggest that they provide compelling reasons for action on their own, quite
apart from the numbers of adherents they enjoy or the consequences they generate.
25. See, e.g., John Walters, Pay unto Others as They Have Paid unto You: An Economic
Analysis of the Adult Child's Duty To Support an Indigent Parent, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUEs 376, 378 (2000) (arguing that "Iu]niform recognition and enforcement of filial support
laws could lead to substantial savings"); Katie Wise, Note, Caringfor OurParentsin anAging
World: Sharing Publicand PrivateResponsibilityfor the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 563, 584 & nn.133-34 (2002) (citing literature observing that care of dependent elderly
persons by family members will save money, and asserting that "the public as a whole would
benefit from this efficient use of resources").
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important that privatizing these costs removes them from the public
budget; indeed, the attraction of minimizing public costs often
drives policy choices.2 6 But we must carefully distinguish changes
that merely shift burdens from one party to another from those that
actually represent cost reductions. To begin with the easiest case,
if an elderly person is receiving nursing home care that costs $2000
per month, simply changing the payor from a public agency to the
person's own adult child does not "save" $2000 in costs each month;
it merely moves the costs from a public agency to a private party.
This scenario involves a distributive change that we might view as
normatively desirable or undesirable, but the costs themselves
remain.27 This is quite easy to see when the costs in question
continue to take the form of a check to a third party.
Now suppose instead that the adult child can care for the elderly
person in her own home for an out-of-pocket cost of $300 per month,
in contrast with the out-of-pocket cost of $2000 per month for
institutional care. We cannot say whether the home-care arrangement actually reduces costs until we know the opportunity costs of
the caretaker's time, 28and the intangible costs or benefits associated
26. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage:Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644-46 (2003) (discussing
states' promotion of marriage as a means of privatizing female dependency within the family);
Jacobus ten Broek, California'sDual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
PresentStatus, PartII, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614,624 (1965) (explaining that divergent treatment
of the property and resources of spouses under the laws governing the support of the poor, as
compared with their treatment under ordinary family law, stems from the use of the spousal
relationship in the former case as "a device for minimizing the public cost of supporting the
poor by tapping what would otherwise be the separate property or income of one spouse for
the support of the other").
27. See, e.g., Usha Narayanan, Note, The Gouernment'sRole in Fosteringthe Relationship
Between Adult Childrenand TheirElderParents:From FilialResponsibilityLaws to... What?,
A Cross-CulturalPerspective,4 ELDER L.J. 369, 379 (1996) (discussing this cost shifting and
citing a dissent in Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 859-60 (Cal. 1973) for the
proposition that the shift may move costs to a politically vulnerable group).
28. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Contractand Care,76 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1403,

1411-12 (2001) (explaining that caretaking costs include "a caretaker's need to focus energy
and time on dependency work rather than investing that energy and time in building market
and other skills that would increase her value in the compensated sphere"). Opportunity costs
are sensitive to changes in women's wages. See GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 140

(enlarged ed. 1991) (explaining that "[tihe relative cost of children is significantly affected by
changes in the value of the time of married women, because the cost of the mother's time is
a major part of the total cost of producing and rearing children"). Women's wages, in turn,
may be affected by the decisions that women, on the whole, make based on those wages.
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with providing in-home care, such as the impact of having an
additional person in the household." If we could somehow determine that the in-home care costs would work out to just $1500 per
month after taking into account the opportunity costs and intangible
factors involved, then we could say that the in-home care reduces
overall care costs. However, this still does not establish, by itself,
that shifting the burden of care to the family generates cost savings.
To see this requires keeping conceptually separate the question of
what is the cheapest type of care, and who should bear the costs of
that care. In this example, in-home care provided by a relative is
cheaper than institutional care. In theory, these same savings could
be achieved in a regime that placed the costs of the care on the
government rather than on the family member. For example, the
family member providing in-home care might receive reimbursement for that care from the public fisc through a tax credit.
If, however, there are additional administrative costs associated
with a regime in which government reimbursement is provided, or
if behavioral changes in light of government reimbursement result
in more dependence, more costly dependence, or more costly
dependent care than otherwise would be the case, these would
represent net additions to the overall cost. By the same token, there
may be behavioral responses to efforts to place (or leave) costs on
the family that will themselves change the total costs. If economic
efficiency is one's normative goal, then one should pay close
attention to all of the ways in which the allocational arrangement
affects the total amount of cost that must be borne by someone. If
one is concerned with achieving a particular vision of distributive
justice, then the distribution of costs matters for its own sake,
Moreover, a person's opportunity cost at a given point in time is the product of earlier choices
that may have been influenced by the possibility of later needing to sacrifice paid work in

favor of caretaking. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 28, at 1412 (invoking "psychological or spiritual" costs
.resulting from the attenuated and compromised relationships a caretaker is forced to have
with both market and family if she works in both, or from the need to choose, thus sacrificing
one to gain the other"); NADINE F. MARKs & JAMES DAVID LAMBERT, TRANSrIONS TO

CAREGIVINO, GENDER, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING: PROSPECTIVE EVIDENCE FROM THE
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILIEs AND HOUSEHOLDS (Ctr. for Demography and Ecology, Univ.
of Wisconsin-Madison, NSFH Working Paper No. 82,1999), availableat http'J/www.ssc.wisc.
edu/cde/nsfhwp/nsfh82.pdf(presenting empirical work suggesting that negative psychological

effects are often associated with assuming the role of caregiver for a disabled familymember).
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regardless of whether it generates any net gains or losses overall. As
this discussion suggests, the way in which costs are distributed may
affect the total amount of cost that must be borne-whether due to
impacts on administrative costs, incentives, or other dynamics that
alter the quantity and severity of dependence or the burdens
associated with addressing it. s°
C. Shared Concerns, DivergentInterests
Typically, at least three parties are deeply interested in whether
dependency is adequately addressed: the dependent person herself,
the dependent person's family, and society at large. 1 One way of
framing the question of how to allocate dependency burdensasking who should pay 2 -usefully emphasizes that dependence is
inherently costly and that the costs must be borne by someone.'
Costs do not disappear when they are allocated to the government,
nor when they are borne privately within families through unremunerated caregiving, nor even when they are thrown back upon
the dependent people themselves through neglect or substandard
care.
However, society cannot simply choose a payor from a slate of
choices. While society can, for example, make families nominally
responsible for a given kind of dependency, current and potential
30. The distribution itself might affect overall utility because of the diminishing marginal
utility of money-a dollar paid for care by a poor relative (or a poor taxpayer) arguably "cost s "
more in utility terms than a dollar paid by a wealthy person. Well-known difficulties in
makinginterpersonal utility comparisons make this argument controversial, see, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 23, at 470; Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution,in INEQUALITY AND
POVEMRT 6, 6-7 (Edward C. Budd ed., 1967), but the basic principle remains intuitively
plausible, see, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815,
848-49 (1990). In any case, two other factors-inefficient risk bearing due to imperfections in
markets for insurance, and liquidity constraints resulting from imperfections in capital
markets-continue to blur the boundaries between efficiency and distribution.
31. There might be other interested parties as well, such as friends, neighbors, or fellow
members of religious groups.
32. See, e.g., FOLBRE, WHO SHOULD PAY FORTHE KIDS?,supranote 7; Kaplan, Who Should
Payfor Mom and Dad?,supra note 9; Eric Rakowski, Who ShouldPay for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL.
L. REv. 1345 (2002).
33. The usual suspects for cost bearing include the former and future selves of the
dependent person, the dependent person's family, and society at large. Dependence costs, or
elements of those costs, could also be placed on other groups within society, such as
employers, health care providers, or landlords.
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family members can undertake strategies that shift costs back to
society. The reason that such cost shifting is possible inheres in the
shared interest of families and society in seeing that dependency
is addressed appropriately. Families are typically bound to their
dependent members by love and other forms of interdependence,
but society is also invested in the care of its members. While our
welfare state is not as extensive as that which exists in some
other countries, minimal care for those in need, especially those
who clearly lack the present capacity to care for themselves, is
ingrained in our social and political structure.34 This might be
attributed to altruism, interdependence of utility functions, interest
group politics, a particular view of the purpose of government, or
enlightened self-interest (unalleviated suffering is both intrinsically unpleasant to behold and likely to generate negative societal
effects).
Whatever the origin of society's normative commitments to
dependent people, society will suffer greatly if it fails to keep those
commitments. Society's interest in dependent care therefore serves
to bracket the feasible spectrum of policy choices. Certain options,
such as withdrawal of all societal support for dependent care, are
not on the table. 5
Strategic interactions between families and society structurally
resemble the game of "Chicken."36 Leaving the needs of a dependent
34. See Wax, supra note 10, at 1428-29.

35. This is not to suggest that change is impossible, only that its shape will necessarily
be limited by society's deeply held normative commitments. In addition, the interests of those

who have already "paid into' a certain program or have made other choices based on the "old
rules" introduce a variety of complications. See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT
TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 218 (2000) (explaining that

"one cannot change the rules midstream without creating tremendous hardship for people
who are already in the system'); DANIEL N. SHAvIEO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND

RETROACTIVITY 198-215

(2000)

(discussing transition issues implicated by Social Security reform proposals and possible
approaches for addressing them).
36. In the highway game of "Chicken," two cars drive toward each other, and the first
driver to swerve is called a "chicken" and loses the game. However, each driver prefers this
unpleasant result to the head-on collision that results if neither party swerves. See CHARLES
J. GoEr, LAw AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS 17-18 (1984). This same dynamic

applies somewhat less dramatically in situations where parties have a convergent interest in
avoiding some extremely bad outcome, but divergent interests about how that outcome should
be avoided. Recognizing the convergence of interests in avoiding the disastrous outcome, each
attempts to bluff the other party (or parties) into 'swerving"-that is, bearing the costs of
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person unmet represents the worst outcome for everyone involvednot just for the dependent person and the dependent person's
family, but also for society at large. Although the interests of the
parties converge with regard to the desirability of addressing
dependence, interests tend to diverge on the crucial question of who
should bear the costs.
The divergence of interests will not always be present; there may
be instances where all parties agree that the dependent person
herself should bear the cost in an earlier or later period of independence, through borrowing or saving. Yet, given limitations in capital
markets, this option will not be available for all forms of dependence. In addition, not all dependents will enjoy an earlier or later
period of independence sufficient to cover the costs of dependence.
Finally, even people who have a sufficient period of productivity to
cover their periods of dependence may miscalculate and end up
unable to cover those costs. Providing for one's future dependence
involves interactions among temporal selves, and those interactions
may be influenced by cognitive biases, such as over-optimism or
hyperbolic discounting."7
In all cases where the dependent person has not provided for her
own care, either family or society, or some subset thereof, must bear
the costs. While society will usually try to limit its own exposure to
these costs, the family would prefer that society bore the costs. 8
This assumption is not inconsistent with the family's love and
altruism towards the dependent person, nor is it inconsistent with
the desire that family members might have for personally providing
the care. Recall that we are talking only about who will bear the
costs, not who actually provides the care. 9
avoiding the outcome.
37. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Law and Economics of the Elderly,4 ELDER L.J. 99,114
(1996) (reviewing RIcHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995)) (discussing the "multiple
selves" problem as it relates to savings behaviors and societal provision for the elderly).
38. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 286:
(WIhile many adult children are sufficiently altruistic toward their aged parents
to be willing to incur substantial costs in money, time, irritation, distress, and

even revulsion rather than neglect or abandon them, they would greatly prefer
to shift the burden of caring for their parents, or at least a part of the burden,
onto other shoulders.

Id.
39. It is of course imaginable that some family members would actually prefer to bear the
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D. Implications of a ConstrainedPolicy Spectrum
As noted above, shared interests in dependent care constrain the
spectrum of feasible policy choices. Given divergent interests in the
cost allocation, this constrained spectrum can yield very different
policy prescriptions than would an unlimited choice set. Part I.D. 1
identifies two models for cost allocation that mark opposite ends of
the feasible spectrum. Part I.D.2 illustrates why recognizing the
constraints on the range of choice matters.
1. Bracketing the FeasibleSpectrum
Two approaches occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of possible
cost-sharing arrangements between families and society. American
social policy mixes these two approaches, and adopts various
intermediate approaches. The first approach views the government's
role as limited to patching holes in familial support networks, so
that assistance is supplied to a dependent person only where
familial arrangements are insufficient or absent.' I term this model
"family-first support," to highlight its emphasis on placing costs of
dependent care on families whenever families are capable of
providing that care. Importantly, however, the family-first support
model retains a role for public assistance to dependent persons
when familial resources are absent or inadequate. This model of
public assistance can be distinguished from an opposing model, in
which the government provides an additional safety net for certain
categories of dependent individuals regardless of their familial
resources or arrangements. I call this second model "categorical
support."

costs of caretaking-that is, they would refuse reimbursement for the care, even if it were

offered. For example, perhaps the dependent person's dependence is the result of some
negligent action taken by the family member, and the family member views full cost bearing

as a form of penance that will bring her peace and forgiveness in this life, or redemption in
the next. Such individuals would not be embroiled in a strategic interaction; they would
quietly bear the cost under any cost allocation rule.
40. This model encompasses a variety of approaches, given that government can choose

how broadly or narrowly to define the relevant familial support network.
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This taxonomy aligns in interesting ways with two other distinctions commonly employed in the social welfare literature: the
distinction between universal and means-tested programs,4' and
the largely parallel distinction between social insurance programs
and public assistance programs. 2 Means-tested programs target
assistance directly at the financially needy, while so-called "universal" programs use some criterion other than financial need as the
basis for dispensing benefits.' Once a particular program is styled
as a means-tested one, however, policymakers must decide how
broadly or narrowly to construe the unit that must meet the means
test. This Article assumes that dependent persons are themselves
needy, in the sense of being incapable of securing for themselves a
minimally decent life." However, they are often linked by ties of
blood or law to other people with substantial resources. In deciding
if assistance should be provided, policymakers must decide whether
the resources of those at the other end of some or all of those
familial ties should be included in the means test.
Any program that provides assistance to a dependent person
without regard to the availability of familial resources would constitute categorical support within my schema. To the extent such a
program examines the resources of the dependent person herself
in determining eligibility or calculating benefits, it might be
characterized as a means-tested program that limits its inquiry to
the individual applicant. However, means-tested programs typically
examine the existence and resources of at least some specified
family or household members."3 Means-tested programs that
examine familial resources correspond to the family-first support
model.

41. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, THE LIMiTs OF SOCIAL POLICY 86-97 (1988) (discussing the
distinction between universal and income-tested programs); Fennell, supranote 11, at 320-25

(same).
42. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CrrIZmsHIP: REDEFINING AMERICA'S

WELFARE STATE 4, 10-12 (2001) (discussing America's two-track system of social support).
43. See supra note 41.

44. The fact that many persons may be partially rather than fully dependent does not
change this analysis; they are nonetheless needy with regard to the amount by which their
own resources fall short of the sum necessary to secure a minimally decent life.

45. The reason for this pattern is obvious: A means test would become meaningless if
individuals could qualify simply by shifting assets to close family members.
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Next, consider the distinction that is often drawn between social
insurance programs and public assistance programs." Public assistance programs dispense benefits as a last resort on the basis of
need,47 and historically have required that family members provide
the front line of support.' Such programs would correspond to the
family-first support model. Social insurance programs, in contrast,
operate on a basis rhetorically patterned after market exchange. An
individual earns a benefit through engagement in socially approved
behavior (e.g., market-based work) or by linking herself to a "market
worker" in socially approved ways (e.g., through marriage). By
responding categorically to vulnerable populations, these social
insurance programs often relieve family members of support
burdens that would otherwise fall to them. 9 Because they provide
assistance without regard to familial resources, such programs
correspond to the categorical support model.
Given the parallels just noted, one might wonder what my
classification scheme adds to the well-established dichotomies
between means-tested and universal programs and between social
insurance programs and public assistance programs. These familiar
ways of slicing up the universe of social welfare programs emphasize important strains of thought about the social meaning of
assistance and the behavioral standards for full membership in
society. Yet, these taxonomies focus primarily on the individual
recipient's characteristics, tracking the focus in popular discourse
on personal responsibility. Focusing explicitly on whether a policy
requires contribution of family members' resources directs our
attention to an important fact: The choice in many contexts is not
between self-help and dependence, but rather between two different
46. See KATZ, supra note 42, at 4.
47. Id.
48. See GLENDON, supra note 7, at 306:

Historically, most social welfare programs were developed on the premise that
individuals should receive public assistance only when

their families

(understood to include a wide circle of relatives) were unable to care for them.
That assumption gradually shifted.... But even with the proliferation of various
kinds of public assistance, services, and institutional care, families are still the
major means through which societies deal with dependency.

Id.
49. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 285 ("In the absence of social security, the burden
of maintaining the old would fall to a great extent on the younger members of their families.").
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sources of dependence support.5 ° In other words, this classification
scheme squarely engages the question of how broadly, and to whom,
the costs associated with a dependent person should be spread.
2. CounterintuitiveResults
The foregoing establishes the value of explicitly considering the
way in which a given policy divides dependency burdens between
families and society. But why is it important to frame our analysis
with cognizance of the limits that society's interests place on the
options for dividing burdens? This question is best answered with
an example that illustrates how a policy prescription that seems
completely sensible for achieving a particular goal under an unconstrained choice set can turn counterproductive when the limits on
the feasible spectrum are taken into account.
In past times, families provided reciprocal care to each other
though an unspoken intergenerational pact."' Parents cared for
children during dependency, and, in turn, children cared for parents
during their old age. The fact that the state has taken on support of
aged dependents has, therefore, arguably reduced the incentive to
build family structures capable of providing such reciprocal care. 2
More specifically, it is thought to have diminished parental

50. Cf. Goodin, supra note 15, at 134-35 (observing that often notions of "self-reliance"
deployed in welfare debates encompass reliance on family members and friends).
51. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Parent and Child, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICs 230,250-57 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) (discussing and
critiquing various views of the implicit contract or pact between parents and children,
beginning with Blackstone's).
52. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 28, at 357 (suggesting that public programs, in addition
to market insurance, displaced family care for the ill and unemployed and hence "weakened
the ties of family members by further eroding the traditional role of the family in protecting
members against hazards"); id. at 357-58 (making similar arguments with regard to public
education for children and Social Security payments for the retired); Laurence J. Kotlikoff&
Avia Spivak, The Family as an IncompleteAnnuities Market, 89 J. POL. ECON. 372, 389 (1981)
(presenting analysis that "suggests that the current instability in family arrangements may,
to some extent, reflect recent growth in pension and social security public annuities"); see also
Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: ClassicalFamily Values: Ending the PoorLaws as They Knew
Them, 11 J. ECON. PERsP. 179, 187 (1997) (positing that "[tlhe driving force" in both the
current welfare debate and in the welfare debate that took place in 1834 England was "a
widespread perception that public support of dependents leads to a breakdown in family
structure").
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investment in children.' Because important benefits flow from
parental investments in children, and because stronger family
structures have additional positive spillovers for society, it might
appear that society would be better off if the state were to pare back
its role in providing assistance to aged dependents, so that the
burden of support is thrown back on the family.5 ' If society faced an
unrestricted choice set, so that "family-only" support were an option,
this reasoning would make sense-at least in the absence of
countervailing factors. Given the restricted choice set that society
actually faces, however, moving in the direction of "more family, less
state" is likely to have the opposite effect of the one intended.
To see this, it is necessary to first recognize that in making
family formation decisions, people take into account many different
considerations. For purposes of this simple example, we can divide
the considerations into two categories: (1) the impact on expected
exposure from dependence; and (2) all other considerations (e.g.,
love, companionship, economies of scale, social advantages, biological impulses). The first factor, the impact on expected exposure from
dependence, has two components: (a) reductions in personal
dependence exposure resulting from family formation; and (b)
acceptance of dependence exposure of others owing to family
formation.
With these factors in mind, we can compare three states of the
world, only two of which are located within our feasible spectrum.
Figure 1 sets out the options.

53. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise:Elderly Parentsand Adult Siblings,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 393, 427 (arguing that legal interventions such as Social Security have
reduced the focus on investing in children); Antonio Rangel, Forward and Backward
IntergenerationalGoods: Why is Social Security Good for the Environment?,93 AM. ECON.
REV. 813, 826 (2003) (suggesting that mandatory government provision of transfer payments
to the elderly could "crowd out investment in children within the family"); see also BlUNIG,
supra note 35, at 124 (discussing empirical findings based on national and international data
showing that "more positive investment [in children] (reflected in test performance) occurred
where a lower percentage of elderly lived alone, more negative investment (abuse or
nonsupport) where there were more elderly on their own"). One possible explanation of
Brinig's results is that "parents who expect to be supported by their children in their declining
years are likely to make greater investments in them." Id. at 125.
54. See, e.g., BPINIG, supranote 35, at 125 (N{Ifpublic provision for the elderly results in
less investment in children, some thought might be given to discontinuing or limiting public
support.").
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Figure 1:
Impact on Dependence Costs of Family Formation Under
Three Support Regimes
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In deciding whether to get married or have children, it is likely
that people will take into account the impact of that decision on
their exposure to the costs of dependence-both their own dependence, and the dependence of the other potential family members. Of
course, this will be in addition to many other factors, which may,
separately or in combination, swamp and render irrelevant the costs
related to dependence exposure in the great majority of cases.
However, if we are concerned about the impact of policy on families,
then this suggests that we believe the support regime can have
some impact at the margin, for at least some people. Beginning with
that premise, we can evaluate whether a given support regime is
likely to increase family formation or decrease it, at the margin.
The column for the family-only support regime looks at a societal
arrangement in which the family is the only source of outside
support for dependent persons (that is, the state provides no support
at all to any dependents).55 In this support regime, the chance to
55. Of course, even in the absence of any state support, people could still look to private
nonfamilial support networks, such as charities, churches, or social groups. See generally
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reduce one's own exposure to dependence costs represents an
additional motive for family formation.5 6 This incentive is counterbalanced somewhat by the exposure to the dependence costs of
others that attends adding members to one's family. However, if we
assume that people are risk averse and market opportunities for
pooling risk are absent or inadequate, the chance to pool risks
even within the small group represented by the family makes it
very likely that the disadvantages associated with taking on the
dependence costs of others are outweighed by the advantages
associated with reducing one's own exposure to the risks of unassisted dependence. Moreover, families are, in general, less liquidityconstrained and in a better position to spread costs temporally than
are individuals, at least in the absence of well-developed capital
markets that would permit seamless transfers from past or future
selves. On balance, the expected impact of dependency costs would
most likely weigh in favor of family formation. This expectation
matches with the intuition that a purely familial dependence care
regime serves to motivate and solidify family bonds.
The rightmost column in Figure 1, in contrast, represents a world
in which society provides categorical assistance to all dependent
persons. Where this is the case, neither the advantages of reducing
one's own exposure to dependency nor the disadvantages of taking
on the dependency of other people weighs into the decision about
whether to form a family. When this support regime is compared

DAVIDT. BErro, FROM MuTUAL AmD TO THE WELFARE STATE: FRATERNAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL
SERVICES, 1890-1967 (2000) (discussing social insurance functions formerly provided by
fraternal societies). Likewise, the availability of market products and services would reduce
the need to rely on family, even in the absence of state support. See BECKER, supra note 28,
at 347-48 (discussing ways in which market insurance reduces the need to "insure" through
the family); FOLBRE, supra note 7, at 116 (observing that "[tihe development of capital

markets encourages savings, and the expansion of labor markets makes parents and children
less economically dependent on one another"). The availability of such alternatives provides
another reason why a "family-only" model is infeasible, even aside from the political

infeasibility of the state withholding all dependence support under all circumstances. To the
extent these other private arrangements offer good substitutes for familial support, they
arguably weaken the incentive to form families in the same manner as public support.
56. See Kotlikoff& Spivak, supra note 52, at 388 (presenting a model that suggests, in the
absence of market opportunities for risk pooling, "individuals have strong economic incentives

to establish relationships which provide risk-mitigating opportunities," and suggesting that
"pooling the risk of death can be an important economic incentive for family formation").
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with the family-only regime just surveyed, one can see that the
move to categorical support eliminated what previously had
represented a positive factor in the family formation equation. This
is precisely the comparison that sometimes prompts commentators
to suggest moving back in the direction of family-based support. But
there is a problem with this analysis. A family-only support regime
(to the extent such a thing ever existed) is no longer accessible to us
as a policy option. To its great credit, American society has reached
a point at which it will not allow people to starve to death simply
because they lack family members capable of caring for them. Once
we acknowledge that the family-only model is infeasible, then the
question becomes whether we still should move as far as possible
towards a family-centric model of dependence care.
To answer this question, we must compare categorical support not
to the infeasible family-only support regime, but rather to the
family-first model that occupies the middle column. Under a familyfirst model, primary dependent care responsibility is placed on the
family, but if there is no family, or no solvent family, the dependent
care burden falls to the state. Consider the incentives for a person
to form a family under this regime. Because the state performs a
gap-filling function by providing support to dependent people who
do not have family members capable of providing support, the
incentive to form a family for the purpose of reducing exposure to
the costs of one's own dependence is eliminated, or at least greatly
reduced.57 However, because dependence care falls to the family
where the family exists, forming a family does expose one to the
costs associated with the expected dependence of others.
Thus, one does not gain much benefit in terms of personal dependence cost reduction by forming a family, but one does become liable
for the dependence costs of others. To put it another way, categorical
public support removes a disincentive associated with forming
families when compared to a family-first regime--the exposure to
57. If there are substantial quality differentials between the care one would receive
through state-provided support and from one's family, then the incentive is not eliminated,
but only reduced. Because of the state's desire to shift costs onto the family, it is likely to
attempt to introduce quality differentials to encourage extant families to bear costs. It is
questionable, however, whether these marginal quality differences would be sufficiently
salient to people contemplating family formation decisions to influence their choices.
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the dependent care costs of family members. The net impact of
family formation on exposure to dependence costs is, therefore,
likely to be unfavorable under a family-first regime. This does not
mean that people will not form families--other considerations may
easily overwhelm all concerns about dependence costs-but it does
mean that at the margin, holding all other factors constant, people
will be less likely to form families, and more likely to exit their
families, where possible, than in a regime where dependence costs
are borne by the state.
This conclusion is subject to a number of qualifications. Figure 1
suggests that the other considerations impacting decision making
about family formation are not themselves affected by the support
regime-but I included a question mark to suggest some doubt
about that assumption. One might argue that a society in which
people are made to support their dependent family members is a
society in which family ties receive more emphasis and social
support. This arguably yields a more family-friendly set of cultural
norms that positively influence decisions about family formation. On
the other hand, one might argue that a society that forces people to
support dependent family members fosters a culture in which family
is perceived as a constraint on freedom and autonomy and a drag on
one's potential, such that the actual disincentive associated with
dependency cost bearing is magnified culturally.
Another possibility is that a family-first regime would perform a
useful screening function. Because forming a family represents a
larger commitment and entails a larger degree of sacrifice under
such a regime, the result might be that only the most serious and
committed people would form families, while those who feared
the possibility of caring for others would not.58 In other words, even
if fewer families were formed under such a regime, perhaps they
would be stronger families, and less prone to break-up. If the policy
goal is not to maximize the sheer number of families formed, but
58. Likewise, a willingness to form a family under such a support regime arguably would
signal one's commitment and capacity to take on risk, because family formation would be
more costly for those unwilling or unable to take on the added risk. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL, GAME THEORYAND THE LAW (1994) (discussing signaling and screening). If such signaling
enabled people with similarly strong commitment levels to pair up more confidently, it could
contribute to stable, long-lasting matches.
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rather the number of strong, abiding, and committed families
formed, then placing dependent care costs on the family might
not necessarily work at cross-purposes with that goal-provided
we believe the screening function operates sufficiently well. It is
unlikely, however, that it would function with much precision. In
addition to potentially discouraging people with low levels of
personal commitment from forming families, the family-first model
would also likely discourage those with low incomes, uneven career
prospects, or few marketable skills or liquid assets-that is, those
for whom assumption of additional risk is particularly costly.
There are many other factors that would have to be considered
before arriving at a conclusion about the appropriate policy prescription. The purpose of this example is not to take a policy position.
Instead, this analysis merely illustrates how prescriptions that
appear to have one set of implications under the assumption of an
unconstrained spectrum can have very different implications when
one recognizes that the spectrum of feasible policies is constrained.
Given the policy limitations discussed above, the conventional
approach of weighing policy interventions against the unrealistic
and unavailable baseline of complete nonintervention proves less
helpful than an approach that takes a backdrop of residual societal
support as a starting point. The next Part uses the latter approach
to examine the full range of family reactions to dependency burdens.
II. FAMILY STRATEGIES

The same factors that generate the constrained policy spectrum
and the counterintuitive implications that flow from it-alignment
of interests in dependent care, and divergence of interests over cost
allocations-also complicate policymakers' attempts to select a
particular point along the spectrum of feasible policy choices.
Regardless of what point is chosen, families will be inclined to do
things to limit their exposure to costs. 59 These efforts have implica59. Families are not alone in their desire to limit costs. Society attempts to limit its
exposure both by choosing to allocate some dependent care costs to families explicitly, and by
attempting to encourage further voluntary provision of care through various policy design

features.
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tions for both efficiency and distributive justice. Some actions that
families take in reaction to cost allocations are efficient in that they
actually reduce the sum total of costs associated with dependence
and dependence care. In many other cases, however, families will
take actions that are not designed to reduce costs, but rather to shift
costs onto another party. These cost-shifting efforts, whether fully
successful or not, generate deadweight losses. To the extent the cost
shifts are successful, they will also effect distributive changes that
may be deemed normatively desirable or undesirable.' Therefore,
the desirability of a particular cost allocation cannot be evaluated
without understanding the full range of potential familial responses.
Before I begin to detail those responses, two caveats are in order.
First, notwithstanding my focus on strategic behavior and cost
shifting, I do not assume that people narrowly seek to maximize
wealth to the exclusion of all other goals. On the contrary, I
recognize that many factors will influence how family members will
behave towards each other, and that a great degree of heterogeneity
in such responses is a social fact. Bonds of love and altruism among
family members6 will temper their resort to certain strategies.
Moreover, the very reason that a strategic dilemma exists is because
people care about what happens not only within their own families
but within larger society. We all want dependent people to enjoy at
least a minimally decent life. If this were not the case, there would
be no strategic interaction presented, because nobody would be
susceptible to being bluffed into bearing the costs of addressing
dependency. I do assume that at the margin, pecuniary incentives
can make a difference in behavior, but I make no claims about the
size or universality of the response.

60. If the distributive changes that result from successful cost shifting are deemed
desirable, then efficiency and distributive goals could be advanced simultaneously by
changing the initial cost allocation so that the cost shifting is no longer required. This
assumes that the change in the initial allocation would not also generate new costs that
exceed the savings.
61. Or, to put it in economic terms, 'interdependent utility functions." See BRINIG, supra
note 35, at 83.
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Second, I do not propound an invariance principle.6 2 The fact that
families will try to shift and otherwise reduce costs does not mean
that society's efforts to place costs on them are wholly in vain, or
that the same end-state will result regardless of where society
initially places the costs. On the contrary, society's initial assignment of responsibility to families does make a difference to the
final incidence of those costs. It is expensive to shift costs, and cost
shifting cannot be done completely. Moreover, not all family
strategies shift costs; some strategies have the capacity to reduce
overall dependency costs, thereby securing efficiency gains.
A. Exiting (orNot Entering)the Circle of Support
A system that undertakes to fill gaps in familial support must
first be able to detect whether a gap exists. Policymakers must,
therefore, metaphorically draw a circle around the dependent
person that encompasses some statutorily or administratively
defined categories of family members, and examine the ability of the
people within that circle to provide appropriate support. Regardless
of how expansively or narrowly that circle of support is drawn,' the
very act of drawing it immediately creates a new set of incentives
for potential and existing family members. Because of these
incentives, a government assistance program that employs a gappatching approach inevitably will operate to some extent as a gapenlarging or gap-creating mechanism.
One manifestation of this has already been introduced above: the
decreased incentive (or increased disincentive) to form families." I
62. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility Theory andthe Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL
L. REv. 783, 785-87 (1990) (discussing invariance thesis of the Coase Theorem, in which

society's initial assignment of entitlements makes no difference to the final result).
63. The modem trend has been to draw this circle much more narrowly than in earlier
times. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 47-51 (1981)
(describing the shift from broad-ranging kinship liability under the early Poor Laws to the
current approach, in which legal support obligations extend only to spouses and dependent
children).
64. There are two distinct aspects to this manifestation. One involves reluctance to ally
oneself with existing persons who might become dependent and the other involves reluctance
to bring new dependent people into the world. In both cases, assessment of the costliness of
the avoidance behavior depends on one's beliefs about the societal spillovers created by these
alliances and births-and by the activities that are substituted for them if they do not occur.
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turn now to the incentives that face people who find themselves
already within a legally defined circle of support. Such individuals
have an incentive to exit the circle of support, or to move their
assets outside of it so that they are no longer available for the
support of the dependent person. Accomplishing this would either
shift costs onto other family members, or back onto the state in its
role as gap-filler.
Society need not sit idly by and watch the exodus of people and
resources from the circle of support. Whatever rules are formulated for gap detection will be augmented by support-forcing rules
that require those within the bureaucratically defined circle to
actually provide the support." We often think of family members'
contributions to dependent care as voluntary rather than compelled.
However, unless the coercive force of the state stands ready to
enforce support obligations, the support regime cannot truly be
understood as falling under the family-first rubric. Family members
are free to donate resources voluntarily under a categorical support
regime, but voluntary family choices about how to allocate resources
are likely to be shaped in predictable ways by the assistance regime.
The enforcement of support-forcing rules is costly, however, and
does not always preclude people and their resources from exiting the
circle of support. Affinity-based ties can be broken voluntarily, and
the state is powerless to prevent such terminations. The so-called
"Medicaid divorce" is a classic example. In order for a dependent
individual to qualify for government-funded, long-term care under
Medicaid,' the resources of that dependent individual, and typically
As noted above, it is not altogether clear whether particular failures to marry are socially
costly. Likewise, as will be discussed at some length in Part II.D, infra, it is not obvious
whether the choice not to bear a child is socially costly.
65. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. One particularly interesting example
of a support-forcing rule is the requirement that, in order to receive welfare benefits under

the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program, underage mothers must live in the
homes of their own parents (subject to some exceptions). See 42 U.S.C. § 608(aX5) (2000). This
effectively forces the parents of minors receiving assistance to provide in-kind assistance in

housing, and may as a practical matter lead to other assistance and behavior monitoring as
well. See Goodin, supra note 15, at 136-37 (discussing possible rationales for such a rule).
66. Medicaid is a means-tested health program. Medicare is a categorical program for
people over age sixty-five and for most disabled people. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC
FINANCE 168-69 (6th ed. 2002) (describing Medicaid); id. at 205-09 (describing Medicare).
Medicare does not provide coverage for most long-term care, while Medicaid does. See, e.g.,
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all but a specified portion of the resources of their spouse, must first
be "spent down."6 7 This creates an incentive to stop being a spouse
to a dependent person who will need expensive long-term care."
Knowing that the government will step in to "fill the gap" and care
for the dependent person, a spouse contemplating filing for divorce
for Medicaid purposes need not experience any lapse of love for the
dependent person. Indeed, the dependent person may prefer and
encourage the arrangement if it leaves more resources with loved
ones while not materially worsening her own care situation.
Similarly, family structure andhousehold composition may determine who falls inside and outside of the circle of support in contexts
involving poverty relief for families with children. As a result,
welfare policy arguably has generated perverse incentives.6 9 Rules
for imputing the availability of income and other resources can have
predictable effects on incentives to configure households and
families in particular ways.70
Policymakers can try to control perverse incentives towards gap
creation, although not costlessly. For example, a transfer program
can place limits on the alienation of resources from inside the circle
of support to outside the circle. In the context of Medicaid, "lookback" provisions limit the ability of dependents and their families
to benefit from the transfer of resources during the period preceding
Kaplan, supra note 9, at 66-69.

67. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000) (setting out rules governing treatment of spousal
resources); Kaplan, supra note 9, at 69 (discussing process of spending down resources to
qualify for Medicaid). In some states, notably New York, these spousal contribution
requirements are effectively weakened by laws that permit "spousal refusal." See NY CLS Soc.
Serv. 5, § 366(3Xa) (2003); John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Gain Government
Benefits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POLY 81,95 (2003).
68. See supra note 12. In determining Medicaid eligibility, states are forbidden to consider
the resources of, or impose liability on, any person other than the spouse of the recipient or
a child of the recipient who is under the age of twenty-one. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX17XD) (2000).
This, then, is an example of a limited family-first model, where the circle of support is drawn
rather narrowly.
69. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587,610 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
Government has told a child who lives with a mother receiving public assistance that it cannot
both live with its mother and be supported by its father.").
70. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Household: The Law, Economics, and Sociology of
an Underexamined Institution 51 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(discussing potential influence of governmental welfare and benefit programs on household
composition choices).
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the onset of long-term care. 7 Likewise, garnishment of wages
provides a mechanism for enforcing support obligations before the
opportunity for alienating the resources arises.72 Of course, the
government cannot force family members to contribute resources
they do not have,73 nor can it garnish earnings that it does not know
about.74
Making the gap-filling support substandard to some extent also
will help to discourage gap creation by those whose families would
be able to privately afford better care. For example, because of the
relatively low reimbursement amounts payable under Medicaid, not
all long-term care facilities provide care to Medicaid patients.75
Hence, the care available under Medicaid may be of lower quality
than that which could be obtained privately in some of the better
facilities.7 6 This quality differential keeps the withdrawal of spousal
support from being costless for the dependent person-and to the
extent the able-bodied spouse's utility is bound up in that of the
dependent person, it will not be costless for the able-bodied spouse
either.
This does not necessarily mean that the able-bodied spouse will
be deterred from divorcing. The spouse must weigh the marginal
increase in quality attainable through private funding against the
total cost of the private funding. 77 Where public assistance takes the
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2000) (setting thirty-six month look-back period for alienating
resources; sixty months for trusts); see also Kaplan, supra note 9, at 71-72 (discussing these
provisions).
72. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 666(aXl), (b) (2000) (setting out state plan requirements for
withholding wages to enforce child support obligations).
73. Any change in work effort prompted by a support obligation would depend on the
interplay between substitution and income effects, just as with taxation. See, e.g., Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1919-20 (1987) (discussing these effects in the
context of taxation).
74. See Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and
Other GenderNeutral Topics, 25 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19,37 n.68 (2002) (noting the "practical
obstacles of garnishing wages of men who are self-employed, men who work for different
people (such as construction workers), men who move from job to job, men who work in largely
cash businesses, and men who move out of state*).
75. See Kaplan, supra note 9, at 69.
76. See id. (noting that "Medicaid recipients often find themselves shut out of certain
nursing homes, especially the more desirable ones").
77. For example, assume for purposes of illustration that the dependent person could
receive care at a 20% higher quality level privately than he could achieve under Medicaid. In
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form of cash, families and friends can try to quietly augment that
support without paying the entire bill. For example, many welfare
mothers receive unreported supplements from family members,
friends, and boyfriends.7" Indeed, the grant amounts are so low that
some form of supplementation is a virtual necessity.79 The result is
a form of unofficial cost sharing between the public and those close
to the dependent person.
A primary difficulty with using quality differentials to leverage
contributions from the dependent person's family and affiliates
inheres in the heterogeneity of recipients' access to such private
resources. Dependents without family or friends who are motivated by the quality differential to provide assistance must simply
suffer the consequences of the low-quality care. As with all incentive
schemes in the public assistance arena, we must examine what
happens to those who cannot or do not respond to the incentive
in the preferred manner. Policymakers are faced with a familiar
dilemma: Making assistance too generous makes people more likely
to make choices that increase the cost of the public program, while
making it too stingy keeps it from accomplishing its objectives. In
this case, however, the people potentially making decisions that will
raise costs of the public program are not the recipients themselves,
but those close to them.
When blood ties link a solvent person to a dependent person,
exiting the relationship is difficult.' Opportunities for "Virtual exit"
still exist, however. People can try to disavow their relationship
with the dependent person, mask their solvency, or evade enforcement attempts. These attempts, and costs incurred in attempting
that case, the question for the able-bodied spouse is whether to stay married and foot 100%
of the bill for a 20% quality improvement, or to divorce and pay none of the costs for the care.
In other words, until all her nonexempt resources are exhausted, on these facts the ablebodied spouse receives only a 20% return on each dollar she contributes to her spouse's longterm care, plus whatever nonpecuniary benefits she receives by staying married.
78. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDs MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WoRK 143-91 (1997) (detailing the "survival strategies"

employed by the mothers on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) that were the
subject of the authors' empirical study).
79. See id.
80. See infra Part III.B.5 (discussing relative ease of exit from various sorts of
relationships).
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to thwart them, represent deadweight losses. The state's ability to
counter such efforts depends not only on the technologies available
for confirming relationships and enforcing support obligations, such
as paternity testing and nationwide computer networks, but also on
human factors.
For example, child support enforcement efforts often depend on
the cooperation of the custodial parent-usually the mother. Under
current welfare law, custodial parents who fail to cooperate in the
state's efforts to secure child support are subject to the denial or
reduction of welfare benefits."1 Unfortunately, cooperation can
expose women to the risk of domestic violence. 2 Recognizing this,
many states have taken advantage of a welfare policy option that
allows them to relieve mothers who are the victims of domestic
violence from the duty to cooperate in child support enforcement
efforts.' Currently, the principal problem with this solution seems
to be that women applying for welfare are not made aware of
this provision or are reluctant to reveal that they are victims of
domestic violence. Hence, the provision does not fully protect women
against violence." Yet, even if the provision were widely known,
well-understood, and appropriately invoked, it still would not be a
costless solution. Because relieving women of disclosure obligations effectively relieves men of support obligations, the provision
could provide men with an incentive to pressure women into
nondisclosure, and might even lead some men to resort to the level
of threats and battery necessary to support nondisclosure.

81. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2000). Welfare recipients must assign their right to receive child
support to the state. Id. § 608(aX3).
82. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 4, at 212-13.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(aX7) (2000) (setting out the terms of the Family Violence Option);
Naomi Stern, Battered by the System: How Advocates Against Domestic Violence have
Improved Victims' Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTiNGS WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 57-58
(2003) (reporting that twenty-four states have used the Family Violence Option to waive child
support cooperation obligations). A "good cause waiver" is also available under Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families, and can be used by states to exempt women from child support
cooperation. See id. at 49-50.
84. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 83, at 49-50.
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B. Influencing Dependence of Existing Family Members
Familial behavior can sometimes influence the incidence, length,
severity, and costliness of spells of dependence experienced by
family members. Thus, a more constructive response to dependency
burdens would be for family members to take actions designed to
prevent, forestall, shorten, or ameliorate dependence among those
to whom they are linked. Placing the burden of support on the
family gives the family a stake in dependence, and an incentive to
reduce dependence costs.
For example, parents might take actions early in a child's life that
reduce the child's risk of future dependency. These might include
measures designed to develop the child's human capital (such as
education) or measures designed to keep the child from developing
a costly problem (such as therapy to address an incipient learning
disability)." Likewise, the family might provide various forms of
instrumental support-both material and emotional-designed to
move a presently dependent person into an independent position.
Families are arguably better positioned than government agencies
to deliver the appropriate quantity and type of assistance and to
monitor and enforce particular norms of behavior.s A family
member can exhort, cajole, threaten, supervise, shame, and
85. Parents' decisions on these fronts may be influenced not only by dependency cost
allocations but also by institutional and legal arrangements for addressing particular
conditions. For example, a learning disability diagnosis might trigger various institutional
accommodations (e.g., in test taking). See MARK KELMAN & GILUAN LESTER, JUmPrNG THE
QUEUE (1997).

86. See David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification,74
WASH. U. L.Q. 15 (1996) (discussing families' heightened capacity and motivation to monitor
and control the behavior of their members, as compared with most groups of unrelated
persons); cf Daryl Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345,359 (2003) (explaining
how making medieval merchants of a town liable for each other's debts "would leverage these
intra-borough and intra-guild governance structures, creating incentives for local merchants
to police one another's debts"); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 841, 888-89 (1999) (discussing heightened ability of rotating credit association
to engage in peer monitoring, given social, ethnic, and cultural ties). The same rationale can
be used to support group punishment in various contexts. See Levinson, supra, at 348
(explaining that "[giroup members might be punished not because they are deemed
collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous
position to identify, monitor, and control responsible individuals, and can be motivated by the
threat of sanctions to do so").
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otherwise influence a dependent person in many ways that would
be inappropriately intrusive for a governmental actor.
Placing dependence costs on the family also effectively privatizes
eligibility and termination determinations--decisions whether
someone is truly capable of self-support at a given point. Family
members have obvious informational advantages over government
actors,8 7 and can more cheaply ascertain whether someone really
requires outside support. The family-first model gives family
members a direct incentive to make this judgment as accurately as
possible, because doing so will minimize the family's dependence
costs. If the family finds that a family member is only pretending to
need assistance, it can move the costs of support onto the shoulders
of the individual herself. This shift may have the effect of helping to
develop the individual's human capital, as well as that of her wouldbe caretakers. Such human capital development could, in turn,
make later spells of dependency less likely.
While these strategies have the potential to reduce dependence,
they are subject to important limitations. First, some kinds of
dependence neither produce serious eligibility disputes nor provide
meaningful opportunities for preventing or reducing dependence.
One cannot, for example, convince an infant to be more selfsufficient. In such cases, the family will not be able to resort to the
set of strategies described here.
Second, the family's interests in cost minimization may not align
perfectly with the individual's interests in human capital development or personal fulfillment. For example, a family concerned with
getting a teenager into a position of self-support as quickly as
possible might push her to enroll in a vocational training program
rather than a four-year liberal arts college.' While the interdependence of utility functions among family members can cause the
87. See Haddock & Polsby, supra note 86, at 20 (discussing informational advantages that
parents often have).
88. Similarly, in traditional societies, "[flamilies held accountable for the performance of
their members would guide and, if necessary, force members into activities where they could
contribute most to the reputation and opportunities of the whole family." BECKER, supra note
28, at 345. Even if the individual's long-run earnings would be optimized through the course
of action pushed upon her, personal autonomy is compromised when family members dictate
choices.
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family to identify with the dependent person's goals and thereby
prevent such outcomes, other factors, such as liquidity constraints
facing the family, may contribute to them.8 9
Finally, notwithstanding the family's informational advantages,
families can make mistakes about what the dependent person really
needs, or even about whether an apparently dependent person is
really dependent. If the family falsely believes that a person is
dependent when she could actually care for herself, this presents
the sort of costly eligibility mistake that society expends so much
effort attempting to avoid. If, instead, the family falsely believes
that the individual is capable of self-support when she actually is
not, the family's efforts to motivate the person to accept responsibility for her own support may become inappropriate or even abusive.
C. Spending Less on Dependent Care
Where dependent care costs fall to the family, the family has an
incentive to reduce the costs associated with care. This incentive
serves a useful function where it induces families to select the least
expensive type of care. However, it also could induce family
members to attempt to offload some of the costs onto the dependent
person by providing substandard care. 9 ' In the typical case, strong
bonds of love between family members limit this possibility. Yet,
where support-forcing rules impose burdens on family members who
lack both altruism and the ability to exit from the circle of support,
unproductive cost shifting onto the dependent person becomes a
serious risk. Public agencies can and do monitor and punish such
behavior when it becomes extreme enough to constitute abuse or
89. For society, the situation is reversed: Society generally has less concern for the
individual's long-range goals, once some minimal level of self-support is attained, but it also
has more liquidity.
90. Recreating such incentives through a socially funded program would be possible, but
would involve heightened administrative and enforcement costs. For example, each person
caring for a dependent individual could be reimbursed based on the "going rate" for
institutional care, and could then keep any surplus they could generate for themselves
through home care or other arrangements. This would require careful monitoring to prevent
fraud, and would introduce administrative costs associated with providing reimbursement.
91. Abuse and neglect can be understood as "negative investments' in individuals, rather
than positive ones. See BRmNIG, supra note 35, at 124.
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neglect, but enforcement is imperfect and a great deal of problematic conduct goes undeterred.
Family members can also chisel on care in smaller ways without
triggering legal intervention. Sometimes this does not represent
a volitional choice, but rather the imperative of poverty and
illiquidity. For example, a parent who lacks funds to purchase highquality day care, and who has no savings that would permit her to
suspend working for a period of time to provide the care herself,
may opt instead for substandard care.
D. ChildbearingDecisions
So far, I have been considering the family's interaction with
existing dependent persons, or existing persons who might become
dependent. Of course, family members also determine whether new
dependent persons enter society. The decision to bear a child entails
bringing into the world a person who will be dependent for a
significant period of time. Thus, one way families can reduce their
exposure to dependent care costs is to have fewer or no children.
While many factors influence the decision whether to have a child,
a family that must bear the costs of childrearing will have less
incentive to have a child (or more incentive to avoid having a child)
than would be the case if society assumed some or all of the costs of
raising the child.' Moreover, to the extent that parents cannot fully
spread costs of childbearing over the parents' lifetime earnings,
birth timing may vary depending on the societal arrangement.'
92. In the United States, the costs of childrearing fall primarily on the family. However,
an estimated 38% of the costs of childrearing are covered by society. Mary Anne Case, How
High the Apple Pie?A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of
Carefor ChildrenShould Be Shifted, 76 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1753,1775 (2001). A major subsidy
comes in the form of the public provision of elementary and secondary schooling. Parents also
receive tax credits and exemptions, which are estimated to total roughly 8% of direct
childrearing costs. FOLBRE, supra note 7, at 200. Additional support takes the form of "familyfriendly" legislation, assistance that reaches children in low-income families, assistance
targeted at disabled children, and assistance that reaches the children of workers covered
under public or private benefit programs.
93. Decisions that might be perceived initially as merely ones of timing ultimately may
have impacts on the overall birthrate or on the chances of longer-term dependency. See, e.g.,
Brinig, suprm note 51, at 231 (observing that "the difficulty of conception and incidence of
genetic problems both increase with the age of the mother"); Joseph Pliskin et al., Optimizing
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Does the decision not to have a child represent a reduction in
overall costs for society, or merely an expensive shifting of costs? On
one account, costs saved by the parents are borne by the unborn
child, who does not get to enjoy the benefits of existence. It is
possible that the child would get more benefit from living than this
would cost the parents, and were the child able to negotiate in
advance with the parents to, for example, obligate some fraction of
her future earnings, a Pareto-improving bargain could ensue."
Another view is that the parental cost savings come at the
expense of society at large, which loses a potentially productive
worker. Because society could have tapped the would-be worker's
productive capacity to help pay for later dependency costs, the
argument runs, the worker's nonexistence pushes greater dependency burdens onto other members of the now-smaller birth cohort.
The fact that there are alternative ways of expanding the workforce,
notably through a liberalized immigration policy,95 undermines this
argument considerably.
While the societal benefits flowing from well-raised children are
beyond dispute," assessment of the benefits flowing from good
childrearingshould be kept analytically separate from assessments
of the social impact of decisions about childbearing. Clearly, once
the PrenatalDetectionof Down's Syndrome: A Decision-Analytic Economic Policy Analysis, in
WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 185, 186, 187 fig. 11-1 (Richard J.

Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996) (noting correlation between increased maternal age and the risk
of Down's syndrome).
94. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON.
1, 15 (1988) (presenting a thought experiment involving such a pre-birth contract); see also

BuRGGRAF, supra note 13, at 76 (explaining that "[ulnborn children obviously can't sign
prebirth contracts, but it is not unreasonable to hypothesize what kind of contract a child
would be willing to sign with parents for quality care when he or she is old enough to
understand the terms"); id. at 69-85, 193-210 (proposing, describing, and defending a
"parental dividend" that would replace Social Security and give parents a stake in their
children's earnings).
95. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 43 (observing that 'the United States could by
liberalizing its immigration laws lower the dependency ratio pretty much at will"); Case,
supra note 92, at 1774 (discussing the ability of immigrants to take up any demographic

slack).
96. See, e.g., FOLBRE, supra note 7, at 254 (asserting that "[clhildren, like the
environment, are a public good"); Allison Moore, Book Note, "From Opportunity to
Entitlement"and Back Again-OrBeyond, 106 YALE L.J. 923,926 n.12 (1996) (observing that
"[wlelfare benefits can be seen as directly analogous to public works programs, with 'rearing
children' seen as work that has an important public component").
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a child is born, it is overwhelmingly in society's best interest to
ensure that the child receives adequate care and appropriate
investments in developing her human capital. But the sign and
significance of the externalities, if any, associated with bringing a
child into existence in the first place are far less clear. When one
has a child, is one performing a valuable public service, or merely
making a consumption decision?9 7 It is not possible to answer this
question in the abstract without knowing something about the
underlying population dynamics, including immigration trends
and policies, as well as something about what will happen to the
child once she is born. The contribution that an individual makes to
society is not a fixed quantum, but rather depends on the human
capital that a given individual can bring to the table under a
particular set of social and economic conditions. The fact that the
spillovers associated with choices about the bearing of children
depend on later human capital investments made with regard to
those children, and the further fact that these later actions depend
to some degree on personal financial resources, complicate matters
enormously.
Consider the following stylized example: Imagine there are two
possible levels of care and investment in a child-high and low.
Each new child will generate a positive spillover for society if she
receives the high level of care, and a negative spillover for society if
she receives the low level of care." Further, assume (as seems
97. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 15, at 21 n. 15 (attacking the argument that a preference
for a child is no more entitled to a subsidy than any other consumer preference, such as a
preference for a Porsche). One need not believe that having a child is analytically similar to
a consumer purchase to question the magnitude and direction of externalities flowing from

the childbearing decision, however. See, e.g., Case, supra note 92, at 1779-80 (suggesting that
a child be viewed not as a Porsche, but rather as a poem-a creative endeavor that can
produce positive or negative externalities); ANNE L. Ais'rTr, No EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE
THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 95, on file with author) (observing that children may create both negative and
positive externalities). Moreover, even if we grant that the externalities associated with
childbearing are generally positive, this would not tell us how much of the cost of childrearing
should be borne by society. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: LiberalJustice and
Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L.J. 1, 32 (2003) (observing that the existence of
positive externalities associated with children would not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the government should pay all of the costs associated with their care).
98. There might be decreasing marginal positive externalities from additional children
receiving high-level care, and increasing marginal negative externalities from children
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realistic in the usual case) that parents are moved by love to provide
the high level of care for an extant child if able to do so," but that
many parents can derive value from having a child even if they do
not have the capacity to provide a high level of care. At first blush,
this set of assumptions suggests subsidizing the childbearing of
parents who will provide high-level care, and taxing the childbearing of those who will provide low-level care."°° But consider what
happens when we add a further assumption-that financial resources play some role in determining whether a parent is able to
provide a high level of care.'0 ' If the correlation between financial
resources and the ability to provide a high level of care were strong
enough, our earlier logic would seem to lead us to the troubling
prospect of taxing the poor for bearing children (or, alternatively,
paying them not to have children), but subsidizing the solvent when
they bear children. The distributive justice concerns associated with
this solution should be apparent, although one can find some hints
10 2
of this idea in policy discourse.
There is also a problem from an efficiency perspective: Any
subsidy or tax designed to influence decisions about whether to have
a child could also affect the ability of parents to provide high-level
care. If we believe that parents are heterogeneous with regard to
both resources and the utility they derive from having a child, we
receiving low-level care, but these complications are ignored for purposes of the example.
99. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 94, at 3-4 (discussing parental altruism). While

parents may not always invest optimally in their children, see id. at 5-6 (discussing
circumstances in which investments will be suboptimal), the "high"level of care in this simple

example does not require optimal investments, merely investments above the minimum
threshold sufficient to raise a productive citizen who generates positive spillovers for society.
100. The practical and philosophical problems with such an approach are obvious. See

Case, supra note 92, at 1778 (observing that "some people ... make better parents than
others," and asking rhetorically, "[s] hould state subsidization take this into account?").

101. Factors other than finances obviously affect the capacity of a parent to provide a high
level of care. See generally SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND

CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES (1997) (examining the relationship between parents' money and
children's outcomes). The fact that money may not be sufficient to secure good outcomes for

children does not alter the fact that some minimal baseline of resources is necessary to the
achievement of such outcomes. See, e.g., id. at 148 (observing that nonmonetary factors gain

importance in determining outcomes after "basic material needs are met" and suggesting that
meeting these basic needs remains crucial).
102. Policies designed to discourage welfare-dependent women from bearing children might
be understood in these terms. See Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, Do PoorWomen Have
a Right to Bear Children?,AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 1, 1995, at 43.
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cannot expect a tax on childbearing by the poor to discourage all
childbearing by the poor. Imposing a tax on children of the poor
would, on the simplified assumptions above, make it more likely
that the low level of care would be provided, because parents who
already have few resources would be further deprived of resources.
The same is true to a lesser degree when childbearing by the poor
goes unsubsidized, if poor parents lack the wherewithal to provide
the high level of care.
Society could instead provide parents with enough money to
support the high level of care for each child that they bear. In the
case of very poor parents, however, this would mean not just
subsidizing childrearing, but supporting it wholly. Complete support
costs society more while producing no greater benefits in the
form of positive spillovers than would be achievable with a smaller
subsidy (or no subsidy) to the more well-off. Moreover, we might
expect this complete support to increase the rate of childbirth
among the less well-off."° This would in turn increase the need for
such total support in order to stave off negative externalities and
ensure the production of positive externalities.
If some parents know they are more likely to have children
who will be permanently dependent, their choices require special
attention.' Other things equal, we would expect fewer parents
to choose to have children at high risk of permanent dependency if
society is unwilling to share in the costs of providing for the child's
care-both during childhood and throughout the child's adult life.
103. While the argument that welfare encourages women to have more children is often
greatly overblown, it does make children relatively more affordable (or relatively less
unaffordable), than would otherwise be the case, and so may make a difference at the margin
in a woman's decision to bear a child that she could not support on her own. See, e.g., BRINIG,
supra note 35, at 60-61 (discussing the possibility that these incentive effects play some role
in explaining unwed birthrates); Fennell, supra note 11, at 288-90.
104. While there are many conditions leading to long-term dependency that cannot be
predicted, it is sometimes possible (and may be increasingly possible in the future) to obtain
information about the likelihood of certain costly conditions by testing parents before
conception, embryos before implantation, or the fetus before birth. See, e.g., Pliskin et al.,
supra note 93, at 185 (noting that "[m]any birth defects, especially ones resulting from
chromosomal abnormalities, are now detected prenatally"). The welter ofknotty issues raised
by these possibilities is discussed in, e.g., id. at 195-98; Rakowski, supra note 32; Jonathan
Glover, Future People, Disability, and Screening, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GRoups AND
GENERATIONS 127 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds. 1992).
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However, parents typically lack precise information about the
chances of a child ending up permanently dependent. If parents are
very risk averse about the prospect of liability for the lifelong care
of a severely disabled child,° 5 perhaps they will be reluctant to have
any children unless they can somehow insure against that risk. And
if we think that children usually generate positive externalities for
society, then society might wish to buffer the risk associated with
bearing a severely disabled child by taking on some of the costs.
In sum, we might expect the level of public support for childrearing to have an impact at the margin on the number, timing, and
potentially even the characteristics of children. Parents' decisions
whether to bear children will also be influenced by the societal
arrangements for the care of dependent elders. If a family-first
model of public assistance for the aged were employed and quality
differentials were used to discourage familial default, then the extra
increment of quality that would be available through the private
funding of care during old age could influence choices about
childbearing.' If an acceptable level of assistance is provided
regardless of family resources, then there is little incentive to use
childbearing as a way of privately funding one's dependence needs
during old age.'0 7
E. Shifting Costs onto Other Family Members
Up to this point, the discussion has treated the nondependent
family members as a monolithic decision-making unit. This is rarely
105. See BURGGRAF, supra note 13, at 48 (noting that the risk of bearing a severely disabled
child is one of several risks parents face).
106. Such finely tuned calculations may not be realistic when quality differentials are
relatively small and the floor of care provided offers a minimally decent life, but would seem
more plausible if the quality differential were such that dependent elderly people without
family support lived lives that were obviously miserable. However, it is also possible that
people are so unduly optimistic about their own future prospects or so unaware of future
societal provisions that these calculations would not be made at all. The relative unpopularity
of long-term care insurance may be rooted, at least in part, in such a combination of optimism
and obliviousness. See Kaplan, supra note 9, at 73-74 (citing popular misunderstandings
about long-term care coverage under Medicare, as well as the fact that "[njo one wants to
imagine himself or herself as disabled and requiring full-time assistance with the basic
activities of daily living" as reasons for the unpopularity of the coverage).
107. See supra Part I.D.

1496

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1453

the case. Indeed, another potential strategy is for individual family
members to attempt to shift costs onto each other. Such intrafamilial cost shifting has historically followed gender lines.' Unfairness
imposed on women through this private cost shifting occurs out of
the public eye, and unless some statute is violated, beyond the law's
reach.' Moreover, because the opportunity costs women incur in
providing care to dependents have not been fully recognized, an
illusion of relatively cheap or costless dependent care has emerged
that is wholly inaccurate.
There is a self-perpetuating character to these gendered patterns.
A woman's opportunity costs in caring for dependent people in the
household are a function of her earning capacity in the marketplace, as well as of tax and benefit policies." 0 However, her earning
capacity in the marketplace at a given point in time depends on
investments she (or others) made in her human capital during
earlier periods. In those earlier periods, investments were made (or
not) based on predictions about their returns. If women are more
likely to foresee interrupting their careers for caregiving, then this
decreases their expected returns on the human capital investments
that they make in the earlier periods."' By the time the decision is
108. See Fineman, supra note 28, at 1406:
One focus for the dissatisfaction with the privatization of dependency is the
continuing unequal and gendered division of family labor, which burdens women
more than men. Within the family, there is also delegation of responsibility for
dependency-caretaking has traditionally been and largely remains gendered
work, assigned to those in the family roles of wife, mother, grandmother,
daughter, and daughter-in-law.
Id.
109. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 239 (1989)
(explaining that men's domination of women triggers no constitutional protections, so long as
the law does not grant men a positive right to dominate women). The law gives women
recourse against crimes, however, as well as the ability to undertake a legally binding "exit"
through divorce. See Carolyn Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Propertiesof Marriage, 104 COLUM.
L. REv. 75 (2004) (discussing the significance of a free exit to marriage as an egalitarian
liberal community).
110. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of EmploymentRelated Child-CareExpenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 358-63 (1998) (discussing
untaxed imputed income associated with household work and the effects of tax credits for
dependent care expenditures required to facilitate work).
111. See VICTOR R. FucHs, WOMEN'S QuEST FOR ECONOMIC EQuALITY 61(1988) (explaining
that "because most young women expect to be mothers, they (and their parents) are less likely
than men to invest in wage-enhancing human capital while in school and in their first job or
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made to forgo market work in favor of dependent care within the
household, the opportunity costs of doing so are often lower than
they would have been had the woman not made investment choices
with an eye to later caregiving. Contributing to the lowered
opportunity costs of women's caretaking are tax schedules that
penalize two-earner married couples,"' and Social Security benefit
rules that often provide married women with no greater benefits
than they would have received without working at all.' Though
these policies greatly improve the lot of those who choose caretaking roles within marriage, they also tend to encourage women to
continue to choose those roles within marriage." Any other factors
that depress women's wages or opportunities relative to men's will

two after leaving school"); Becker, supra note 20, at 394 (explaining that because women's
traditional work patterns were more likely to be part-time and intermittent, "they had fewer
incentives to invest in education and training that improved earnings and job skills").
112. Recent legislation has alleviated this penalty, at least temporarily. Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003); see Mary
Curtius, House Committee Approves $2.4.TrillionBudget for '05, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004
(discussing ongoing negotiations in Congress over tax cut extensions, and observing that both
the House and Senate support extending marriage penalty relief). Significant penalties for
two-wage earners within certain income ranges remain in the Earned Income Tax Credit. See
Allan J. Samansky, New Developments in Marriage Penalties and Bonuses, 96 TAX NOTES
1745 (Sept. 23, 2002). Fixing a "marriage penalty" is not as easy as it sounds; it is logically
impossible to simultaneously equalize the position of single workers, two-wage couples, and
single-wage couples within a progressive tax system. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intermediate
Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 145-47 (1998) (summarizing and
illustrating this "trilemma").
113. The lower-earning spouse, usually the wife, has a choice between receiving Social
Security retirement benefits based on her own earnings record, or receiving 50% of the
amount that her spouse is entitled to receive on his earnings record. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)
(2000) (wives' benefits); id. § 402(c) (husbands' benefits). Thus, for women or men whose
lifetime earnings record entitles them to benefits that are less than half of their spouse's
benefits, years of work and payment into the Social Security system yield absolutely no
marginal benefits, compared with the payout they would have received had they never worked
outside the home. For secondary earners whose earnings are high enough that benefits on
their own records exceed 50% of their spouses' benefit levels, the marginal returns on tax
payments into the system are still far lower than they would be for a primary wage-earner.
See FOLBRE, supra note 7, at 199 ("Since women tend to specialize in non-market work, this
[Social Security rulel effectively lowers the cost of housewives to husbands, discouraging
women's participation in paid employment.").
114. The policies do not, however, help all caretakers-only those who are (or, in some
cases, were) married to a wage-earner. See FOLBRE, supra note 7, at 199.
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also have the effect of artificially depressing women's opportunity
costs in providing dependent care." 5
The fact that one person in the household provides the care does
not mean, necessarily, that she must be the one who is bearing the
cost of the care. A couple might rationally decide that the person
earning the lower market wage will stay home with kids or other
familial dependents, and the person with the higher wage will share
that wage with the stay-at-home spouse. By following such a plan,

both spouses might be better off than they would have been had the
higher-earning spouse assumed the dependent care. 1 6 Yet, the fact
that one spouse is receiving pay while the other is not can perpetuate a power imbalance that makes such equitable cost sharing less
likely." 7 Even if the spouse with the larger salary reimburses the
stay-at-home spouse for her forgone wages dollar-for-dollar, this
fails to compensate fully for her opportunity costs. Such a payment
115. See Fellows, supra note 110, at 347 (explaining that gendered "wage stratification
itself encourages women to remain in their homes to do the unwaged childcare"). For a
detailed discussion of various explanations for the gender wage gap, see Michael Selmi,
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 714-59 (2000). Differential
parental behavior towards daughters and sons could also have an impact on the relative
positions of women and men later in life. See GORDON B. DAHL & ENRICO MoUETnr, THE
DEMAND FOR SONS: EVIDENCE FROM DIVORCE, FERTILITY, AND SHOTGUN MARRIAGE (NBER
Working Paper No. W10281, Jan. 2004), availableat http-/www.nber.com/papers/w10281
(presenting empirical evidence indicating that parents of boys in the United States are more
likely to get married and stay married than parents of girls, and noting possible connections
between these findings and the gender wage gap).
116. Cf. Amy L. Wax, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
EgalitarianMarriage?,84 VA. L. REV. 509,525-26,595-96 (1998) (explaining that, where the
wife can do housework more efficiently than the husband, side-payments from husband to
wife could make an allocation of more housework to the wife Pareto-superior to an even
division of work).
117. See, e.g., AIsrOfr, supra note 97, at 147-48 (observing that "[situdies of marital
decisionmaking suggest that the spouses' relative earning power is one factor in determining
whose opinion counts, and who has control over (or some input in) family spending and other
economic decisions"); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The PartnershipModel
of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1427-29 (1996)
(discussing factors that influence marital sharing, and suggesting that control over resources
is often determined in part by earning power). A power imbalance would be harder to sustain
in a two-earner household, because the money that the less-powerful spouse receives in her
own name increases her "exit threat." See Wax, supra note 116, at 566 (discussing how a
spouse's earned income can affect her "exit threat" and thereby influence marital bargaining
and the prospects for an egalitarian marriage). Power imbalances aside, the very fact that one
party is receiving cash while the other party is not likely will impact the parties' subjective
valuations of the contributions each is making. Id. at 584-85.
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would not take into account the costs of forgoing a growing income
profile over time, nor the different human capital investments that
might have been made in the absence of cultural and economic
pressures towards gendered specialization in dependent care. If the
marriage ends, the financial impact of these forgone opportunities
will be borne by the caregiving spouse." 8
Privatizing dependency within the family also moves decisions
about intergenerational priorities to the family forum.'19 Human
capital investments in the younger generation might be sacrificed
to finance the care of the older generation, for example, or the
older generation might be slighted in favor of the younger generation. Opportunities for strategic behavior among members of the
same generation can also arise. Consider a situation in which an
elderly dependent person has three adult children. Each strongly
prefers that the dependent person receive high-quality, personal
care, but each strongly prefers that the care be provided by her
siblings rather than by herself.' In other words, each sibling has
an incentive to be a free-rider, and to avoid being a "sucker."
Siblings bound together by "love, guilt, and generalized emotional
intermeshings, "'21 might try to work out an amicable solution. Yet,
these solutions are unlikely to be easy or obvious, especially if the
118. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 116, at 517-18 n.12 (citing research on financial status of
women following divorce); id. at 546-47 (observing that "w]omen generally make greater
idiosyncratic, marriage-specific investments than men, and those investments often come at

the expense of labor market opportunity costs"; in contrast, men tend to make "portable"
investments in market work). Alimony does little to make up for forgone market
opportunities. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2069 (1996) (observing that "relatively few
women receive alimony of any kind" and noting criticisms of"rehabilitative alimony"); BRINIG,

supra note 35, at 218 (asserting that "'Irlehabilitative alimony' is ineffective ...
for when a
parent remains out of the job force or otherwise changes work to accommodate children, the

loss is permanent").
119. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MYPAREN ' KEEPER: AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN
THE YOUNG AND THE OLD 7 (1988) ("Shifting costs out of public budgets ...
will not eliminate
competition between the elderly and the young for resources. It will only shift the locus and
burden of that competition-from public budgets to family budgets."); WALDRON, supra note
1, at 381 (discussing costs of uncertainty for the elderly person or reduced mobility and risk

taking for the younger, or both, that accompanies leaving care for the aged to the family).
120. See Brinig, supra note 53, at 411 (observing that "[c]hildren sometimes vie not to
support their parents" even though 'they have a common interest in maintaining the family
name and perhaps in keeping the family property intact").
121. Id. at 412.
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siblings are heterogeneous in terms of resources, earning capacity,
and other familial obligations. For example, some family members
may be better able to bluff others into providing care by pretending personal indifference. The strategic maneuvering among family
members generates deadweight losses that either will be borne by
the caretaker family members or perhaps off-loaded, in whole or
in part, on the dependent person in the form of lower quality (and
122
perhaps grudgingly provided) care.
F. Using FinancialProducts To Address Illiquidity and Risk
Dependence burdens often weigh more heavily on families
than the expected value of the dollar amounts involved would
suggest. There are two primary reasons why this might be the case:
illiquidity and risk aversion. Families can sometimes turn to
financial products in an effort to control exposure to these facets of
dependence burdens.' Specifically, they can reduce their exposure
to risk by purchasing insurance and can temporally spread costs by
borrowing and saving. However, market imperfections, as well as
factors such as moral hazard and adverse selection, impose serious
constraints on the availability of these products in many dependency contexts.

III. TOWARDS A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO DISTRIBUTING
DEPENDENCE COSTS
How might the foregoing analysis inform theory and policy?
Because the familial strategies detailed above affect both the
distributive and efficiency outcomes of societal arrangements for
122. Id at 418-19 (describing the possibility that siblings faced with an aging parent and
an estate containing no property will "engage in a 'hot potato' avoidance game, which may
hurt their elderly parent directly ... or indirectly as she sees she is no longer valued or even
wanted by the children for whom she sacrificed so much"). The fact that some family members
may take advantage of other family members also creates issues of distributive justice, but
it is unclear what the state's role should be in policing intrafamilial unfairness.
123. While dependent individuals can sometimes access these products themselves during
a pre-dependency period, this will not always be possible. Family members can either serve
as agents for the dependent person in securing these products or purchase the products on
their own behalf.
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dependence, it makes sense that those strategies should feature
centrally in deciding how to allocate dependence burdens. In the
sections that follow, I explore how a focus on familial responses
provides a framework for addressing the allocation task. As I will
explain, that framework suggests a system of categorizing dependence costs and generates potential policy innovations. I close with
some qualifications that represent avenues for further research.
A. The Valence and Use of FamilialStrategies
In deciding whether to place dependence care burdens on the
family, it is essential to consider what potential and existing family
members will do in response. Some of the familial strategies
described in Part II represent net cost savings, and hence provide
arguments for making families primarily liable for dependence
care. Other strategies represent familial attempts to shift costs;
because cost-shifting strategies generate deadweight losses, their
availability argues against placing burdens on families. Whether
placing dependence burdens on the family makes sense in a given
context depends, among other things, on the mix of "good" and "bad"
strategies that this will trigger.
Figure 2 categorizes the principal familial strategies discussed
above, based on whether they typically generate "good" cost savings,
"bad" deadweight losses, or ambiguous results. Even though these
categories are framed in efficiency terms, there is a significant
degree of convergence between the results that are normatively
troubling on standard accounts of distributive justice and those that
are inefficient.
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Figure 2:
Family Strategies: The Good, the Bad, and the
124
Ambiguous

"Good" Strategies
(Net Cost Reduction)
A.

B.

C.

Influencing Extent
and Incidence of Dependence;
Making Accurate
Eligibility and Termination Decisions
Choosing Least
Costly Form of Dependent Care

"Bad" Strategies
(Deadweight Losses)
Exiting Circle of
Support; Evading
Support Obligations
Reducing Near-Term
Dependence at the
Expense of LongTerm Human Potential

Strategies Producing
Ambiguous Results
Failing to Enter Circle of Support

Chiseling on Care;
Abuse and Neglect

D.

Choosing Not to Bear
Children

E.
F.

Purchasing Products
to Spread Costs
Temporally or ReI duce Risk
I

Shifting Costs
Intrafamilially
Changing Behavior
in Light of Insurance (Moral Hazard)
I

_I

It would be possible to quibble with some of these classifications.
The important point conveyed by Figure 2 is that different strategy
options carry different valences.
The familial response to dependency exposure in a given context
turns on two factors: (1) the availability of each strategy, and (2) the
cost savings each available strategy generates for the family per
increment of cost expended employing the strategy. Strategies that
are unavailable in a given context cannot be pursued. Among the
available strategies, a rational family member (or potential family
member) will begin with the one that offers the largest marginal
payoff-that is, the greatest reduction in exposure to dependence
costs per unit of input. The family member then will pursue that
124. The letters in the leftmost column correspond to the Sections of Part II, supra.
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strategy up to the point at which another strategy begins to offer a
larger marginal payoff. In order for any strategy to be worth pursuing, of course, it must produce benefits that exceed its costs.
The decision pattern I have just described, when coupled with the
classification of strategies by their valence, permits us to construct
a framework for allocating dependence burdens. We can begin by
categorizing dependence based on functional factors that affect the
availability, desirability, and cost of the various exposure-reduction
actions open to families. Policy can then focus on increasing the
availability of certain good strategies (most notably risk reduction
and temporal cost spreading), and on making good strategies more
attractive than bad ones. A review of good and bad strategies also
helps to identify those instances in which the case for societal
support is at its strongest-where families do not have access to any
good strategies for reducing dependence exposure, and making
additional good options available would cost society more than
simply taking on the dependency burden.
B. CategorizingDependence
What follows is a nonexhaustive list of functional factors for
distinguishing among types of dependence, based on the availability
and desirability of the strategies discussed above.
1. Controllability
When the incidence, extent, or cost of addressing a particular
dependency condition is under the control of any person, societal
arrangements for handling payment can produce incentive effects.
Controllability,"2 understood broadly, provides a way to distinguish
those forms of dependence where familial actions (including the
prior actions of the dependent person) can impact overall costs from
those where familial strategies are limited to cost shifting or to the
purchase of financial products. Put simply, where dependence costs
125. The category of "controllable" costs referenced here diverges somewhat from Martha
Fineman's category of "inevitable" dependence, which includes at least some kinds of
dependence that are the function of someone's choice-such as the dependence that
accompanies childhood. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 18.
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are controllable, an argument exists for attempting to harness the
informational and motivational advantages of the family and to
provide incentives for their cost-reducing actions.
Controllability corresponds to the insurance concept of moral
hazard. If a particular loss is preventable, then insuring against it
could change the behavior of the insured by reducing the insured's
incentive to avoid the loss. 26 For this reason, controllability of a
condition is likely to affect the availability of insurance for that
condition.1 27 Precisely the same problem arises with public provision
of assistance, which represents a socialized form of insurance.'2 8
Arguably, this explains why society makes different provisions for
payment depending on the cause of the dependency.' 29 Insurers can
attempt to address moral hazard and encourage people to undertake
cost-limiting actions. One way to do this is to design policy so that
people are allowed to keep all or part of the cost savings they
generate. A flat grant for a particular dependence condition would
have this effect; if the dependence could be resolved at an actual
cost that was lower than the grant amount, the recipient would get
to keep the difference. The use of lump sum payments to divert
people from the welfare rolls and bonuses for rapid reemployment

126. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance,Risk, and Resource Allocation, reprintedin 4
COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 77, 85 (1984)

(defining "moral hazard" as follows: "The insurance policy might itself change incentives and
therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company has relied.*); G6ran Skogh,
Mandatory Insurance: TransactionCosts Analysis ofInsurance,in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS, supra note 51, at 521, 524-25 (discussing moral hazard and possible ways
of addressing it).
127. See, e.g., BENJAMIN I. PAGE & JAMES R. SIMMONS, WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN Do:
DEALING WITH POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 59 (2000) (noting that "[any insurance system in
which risks are affected by controllable behavior" is vulnerable to moral hazard); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 193-97 (1987) (contrasting situations in

which insureds can and cannot influence risk, and discussing the moral hazard concerns that
arise when risks can be influenced by insureds); Skogh, supra note 126, at 525 (stating that
moral hazard may affect availability of insurance).
128. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 42, at 343 (observing that concerns about moral hazard
have become important in public assistance discussions); ALJaror, supra note 97, at 129-30
(discussing moral hazard problems that attend efforts to assist people in distress ex post); cf.
BEITO, supra note 55, at 45, 49 (discussing measures taken by fraternal societies to weed out
the claims of malingerers and those who contributed to their own condition).
129. Of course, the fact that a condition is controllable does not establish that family
members are in a position to exercise control over it, or even have any influence with respect
to it. See Part III.D.1, infra.
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in the unemployment insurance context provide good examples of
this technique. 3 '
Other ways of controlling moral hazard in the insurance
context include experience rating and other forms of monitoring,
coverage conditions, coverage limits, deductibles, co-payments,
partial coverage, and norms.' These correspond to measures
available in the public arena where dependent care is provided by
the state. Consider welfare policy, which includes monitoring (e.g.,
home visits, caseworker appointments), coverage conditions (e.g.,
work requirements, living arrangement requirements), coverage
limits (e.g., time limits that effectively deny coverage after a certain
number of "claims," and "family cap" provisions that deny coverage
for additional children conceived on welfare), partial coverage (e.g.,
benefits in some states that are too low to support a subsistence
existence), and norms (e.g., stigma and shaming).'32 Alternately,
society could subsidize or reward risk-reducing behavior.

130. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, How To Give Job Seekers a Tastier Carrot, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2003 (discussing incentive advantages of re-employment accounts that would give
unemployed workers a single fixed sum rather than a weekly payout); Kathleen A. Maloy et
al., Description and Assessment of State Approaches to Diversion Programs and Activities
Under Welfare Reform: An Interim Report of the Findingsof the FirstPhase of the Research
(August 1998), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/hsp/diverzn/INDEXJHTM#TOC
(discussing welfare diversion programs, including lump-sum payments), discussedin Matthew
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1152-53 (2000).

131. See e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 947, 949-50 (1988) (discussing mechanisms for addressing moral
hazard, including experience rating-adjusting premiums based on the insured's previous loss
experience); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard:FurtherComment, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 537, 538 (1968), reprinted in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE

ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION, supra note 126, at 103, 104 [hereinafter Arrow, Moral Hazard]
(explaining possible ways an insurer might limit an insured's behavior, including reliance "on
the willingness of the individual to behave in accordance with some commonly accepted
norms"); Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, Lecture Presented to the
Federation of Swedish Industries (1973), in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE

ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION, supra note 126, at 136, 149 [hereinafter Arrow, Information and
Economic Behavior] (noting that moral hazard problems could be eliminated if insurers had
perfect information about the causes of the loss, and whether the insured contributed to it or
could have prevented it); Skogh, supra note 126, at 524-25.
132. See, e.g., R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 350 (2000) (suggesting

that a variety of welfare reform features were prompted by the desire to alter incentive
structures for poor families); KATE, supra note 42, at 343 (noting efforts to address moral
hazard problems through welfare policy).
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There is another side to the controllability of costs, however.
Some things that families might do to control costs are not in the
long-term interests of either the dependent person or the caretaker.
In these cases, creating or maintaining incentives towards cost
control actually could prove counterproductive. To put this another
way, there is a potential silver lining to what we normally think of
as "moral hazard." Sometimes people make decisions that are
normatively better when they are not given an incentive to control
costs. In these cases, public provision of assistance would not create
a distortion against controlling costs, but rather would work to
correct a distortion in favor of controlling costs.
When costs are not controllable, the problem of moral hazard
disappears. We still must differentiate, however, between two
categories under the general heading of "uncontrollable": those that
are predictable by the family, and those that are not.
2. Predictability
Predictability, like controllability, bears on the likelihood that
will be able to pool risk through insurance. However, a
family
a
dependency cost that is merely predictable, but not also controllable,
does not afford opportunities for familial cost reduction. For
example, it may be predictable that a family member will develop
a certain disease, but the course of the disease may be uncontrollable.
If a particular sort of dependency is highly predictable, those who
expect the dependency to befall them will disproportionately seek to
purchase insurance against that eventuality, while those who know
that the dependency is very unlikely to befall them would be less
likely to do so." This phenomenon of adverse selection creates a
market-destroying dynamic in settings where it is not possible or
feasible for insurers to charge different premiums based on different
expected losses."' This might be due to inadequate information that
133. See, e.g., Andy C.M. Chen & Keith L. Hylton, Precompetitive Theories of Vertical
Control, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 573, 581-82 (1999) (using the example of insurance coverage for
pregnancy and delivery, which would be more attractive to those who plan to have children,
to illustrate adverse selection); Abraham, supranote 131, at 946 (describing adverse selection
process).
134. E.g., Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, supra note 131, at 143 (describing
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would enable the insurer to tell good risks from bad risks," 5 or
regulations that prohibit use of certain kinds of information or
otherwise mandate equal premiums.3 6 For example, there might be
genetic conditions that an individual or family knows about, but
that an insurer either cannot discover or for which it cannot charge
1 I3 7
higher premiums.
An insurer must charge premiums that, on average, exceed
average expected losses by an amount sufficient to cover administrative costs and afford a reasonable return on investment. If the
same premium must be charged to everyone, then people for whom
the insurance is a bargain-those whose expected losses exceed the
premium price-will flock to the insurance. This drives up expected
losses and requires a hike in premiums. People, even if risk averse,
will not pay premiums that are vastly out of proportion to their
expected losses. As premiums rise in response to the large expected
losses of the customers who are adversely selecting the insurance,
better risks begin to drop out. This further drives up the average
expected loss and requires additional premium hikes, driving out
the next tier of risks. The eventual result is a risk pool frequented
only by the worst risks-an insupportable outcome. Adverse
selection can be avoided by establishing mandatory insurance pools

how private information destroys markets for risk pooling); id. at 147-48 (describing the
adverse selection dynamic); Skogh, supra note 126, at 525.
135. E.g., Skogh, supra note 126, at 525; Chen & Hylton, supra note 133, at 581-83.
136. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 123-27 (1997) (discussing "community rating").
137. If the insurer can both find out about the condition and charge for it, the adverse
selection problem disappears. See Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, supranote 131,
at 149. A new problem takes its place, however, if those most in need of insurance cannot
afford it. See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/GeneticFair/UnfairDiscrimination
Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 558 (1997). Of course,
insurance can only be made more affordable for bad risks by requiring better risks to cross-

subsidize them-a result that is not uncontroversial, even aside from the adverse selection
problem it might be expected to generate. See EPSTEIN, supra note 136, at 122 (observing that
arguments against insurers' use of information that would permit accurate risk assessments

"reduces to the single proposition that it is appropriate for healthier people to pay the health
insurance premiums for sicker ones'); Russell Korobkin, DeterminingHealth CareRights from
Behind a Veil ofIgnorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 801, 816-28 (discussing whether individuals
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would prefer health care rights that involved such crosssubsidization).
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from which better risks cannot flee."3 To the extent that a particular risk is not predictable, adverse selection does not play a role.
3. Verifiability
An additional factor-the ease with which a particular dependency condition can be verified and the extent of its costs assessed-also bears on policy choices and impacts the feasibility of
insurance. Particularly in the contexts here at issue, which relate
to a person's ability to engage in self-support, it may be difficult to
determine whether a person really has suffered a loss. 39 Mistakes
can run in both directions and track the "eligibility determination"
problems raised earlier.
While unverifiable conditions may not lend themselves to marketbased risk pooling, families often have important informational
advantages about whether someone really requires assistance.
Having someone in the family serve as a "gatekeeper" to assistance
makes use of this advantage.
An interesting tension exists between approaches, such as flat
grants, that might induce recipients to control costs when receiving
public assistance and approaches that would deal well with
conditions that are difficult to verify. In the latter case, it makes
sense to base reimbursements on actual costs. This eliminates any
possibility that an individual could profit from the condition by
obtaining funding in excess of their actual expenditures. Yet,
allowing people to "profit" from their own cost-reducing efforts lies
at the heart of a plan to incentivize cost reductions through a flat
grant."4 Reimbursing only for actual expenditures removes that
138. See Skogh, supra note 126, at 530 (explaining that mandatory insurance pools may
be beneficial because "if bad as well as good risks are forced to pay a premium (tax), all can
be insured, which may be preferable as compared to a situation where no one is insured"); see
also Richard L. Kaplan, Taking Medicare Seriously, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 793-94

(describing how permitting withdrawal of good risks from Medicare would create an adverse
selection problem).
139. See, e.g., Kotlikoff & Spivak, supra note 52, at 373 (observing that "the ability of the

public market to determine the extent to which the individual actually suffered an earnings
loss or is simply lying about his backache is highly questionable"); ALs7Orr, supra note 97,
at 273 (discussing potential for families to misrepresent their circumstances and claim falsely
to have suffered a severe loss).

140. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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incentive. Hence, a stronger case for leaving costs on the family is
presented when a condition is both controllable and difficult to
verify than when simply one or the other of these characteristics is
present.
4. Temporal Lumps and Variances in Outcomes
Additional distinctions among types of dependence relate to the
uniformity of impacts across families, and the degree of temporal
concentration of dependence costs. These distinctions relate to the
significance of opportunities to pool risk and spread costs temporally.
Consider four kinds of hypothetical dependence that produce the
same expected loss of $25,000. The first form of dependence, Type
A, affects every family in society and generates a $500 loss for each
of fifty years. The second form of dependence, Type B, also affects
every family in society, but the loss is entirely concentrated upon
some randomly occurring five year stretch of time; it will generate
losses of $5000 for each of those five years. The third form of
dependence, Type C, affects one out of every 100 families, and
imposes a loss of $2.5 million, spread out over a fifty-year period.
The fourth form of dependence, Type D, also affects one out of every
100 families and imposes a loss of $2.5 million, this time concentrated upon a randomly occurring five-year stretch.
Of course, no real-world type of dependence perfectly patterns
itself after any of these four highly stylized types. However, these
four stylized types of dependence allow us to examine the additional
costs associated with temporally concentrated dependence "lumps"
and unpooled risk, respectively. Because one or both of these
problems accompany many real-world dependence burdens, it is
helpful to break out the work each does in generating extra
disutility for families bearing dependence burdens.'"
We would expect most families to prefer the Type A loss to any of
the other types, and to dislike the Type D loss the most. The Type
141. By "extra disutility," I mean that which exceeds the disutility associated with the
expected value of the loss. For purposes of this simple example, I ignore the impact of
discounting on the relative disutility of the various dependence burdens, and assume that the
expected financial impact is equivalent in present value terms for each type of dependence.
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A loss affects all families equally; hence, there is no risk associated
with it. It also produces no temporal "lumps" of costs. Putting aside
the impacts of the progressive tax system used to fund dependence
costs, Type A is virtually indistinguishable from socially provided
dependence care. Every family pays the same relatively low amount
every year, just as they would if they were paying taxes to support
paying for dependent care.
Type B differs from Type A in that it features temporal expenditure lumps. Viewed over the life cycle, there are no interfamilial
differences in dependence burdens; however, families' dependence
costs fluctuate temporally. If the family can make use of savings to
cover the expenditure lumps, or can borrow against future earnings
to finance the dependence, no change in the life cycle consumption
profile will result. However, capital markets do not provide lowincome individuals with meaningful mechanisms for shifting costs
to different portions of the life cycle." Close-knit extended families
can sometimes substitute for imperfect capital markets by helping
each other through difficult portions of the life cycle. This spreads
the costs of dependency beyond the nuclear family and replicates, on
a family scale, the life-cycle-smoothing effects of public provision for
dependency." If the family is large enough, the randomly distributed lumps may begin to even out.
Where neither an extended family nor financial products exist to
smooth the life cycle consumption profile, liquidity shortfalls can
result. This creates added pressures to limit or shift costs. Optimal
investments in the human capital of the dependent person may be
forgone in the interest of cost savings. Liquidity shortfalls that are
temporally concentrated on periods of dependency care, or the
anticipation of those shortfalls, can also have profound effects on the
development of the human capital of caretakers, or on that of other
142. See, e.g., ALSTr, supra note 97, at 114 (noting the liquidity shortfalls that people
often face during the childrearing years).
143. Cf Kotlikoff& Spivak, supra note 52, at 373 (explaining how family arrangements can
mimic annuities by protecting against the misallocation of consumption over the life cycle).

Similar observations have been made about close-knit rotating credit groups, such as the
Korean "kye." See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CKI. L. REV. 133, 174-75 n.118 (1996)

(observing the ability of these credit groups to "flatten out" consumption over time, to achieve
an effect similar to that obtainable through lending and savings instruments), quoted and
discussed in Cao, supranote 86, at 909-10.
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members of the dependent's family. The impact would be greatest
on young, poor people who have no assets other than their own (as
yet undeveloped) human capital to use as collateral, but who stand
to reap large gains from human capital investments.
Type C dependence does not involve a temporal "lump" for the
family to contend with, but it does generate large variances in
outcomes. Ninety-nine out of 100 families get away with no burden,
but the unlucky one percent is hit with an extraordinarily large
burden. If people are risk averse, this increase in the variance of
outcomes is extremely costly.1" In some cases, this problem can be
addressed by insurance. When insurance is unavailable or unaffordable, families remain exposed to increased risk and hence are worse
off than in a world where risk is buffered.
Of course, the extended family can serve as a private risk-pooling
4 5 This type of risk pooling has a number of advantages over
entity."
insurance available in the open market. Owing to the small number
of players, the bonds of trust that typically exist among them, and
the high level of information they have about each other, moral
hazard, adverse selection, mistakes in identifying losses, and
transactions costs all may be diminished. 1" However, the family
group may be too small to effectively pool risk, or may find that47
its members suffer risks that are correlated with one another.
Moreover, as noted before, when the risks of individuals without
144. See, e.g., A.MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53 (2d ed.
1989) (defining risk aversion and noting that it is generally realistic to assume that people are
risk averse, at least when risks are large); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw &
ECONOMICS 47 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that economists presume most people are risk averse);
SHAVELL, supra note 127, at 190 (explaining that "[tlhe presence of risk-averse parties means
that the distribution or allocation of risk will itself affect social welfare").
145. See, e.g., BECKMR, supra note 28, at 343 (explaining that a kinship group in traditional
society operates to protect its members against uncertainty); Kotlikoff & Spivak, supra note
52, at 372 ("The institution of the family provides individuals with risk-sharing opportunities
which may not otherwise be available.*).
146. Kotlikoff& Spivak, supra note 52, at 372; see also BECKE, supra note 28, at 343 ("A
kinship group is a reasonably effective 'insurance company,' in that even an extended group
is sufficiently small to enable members to monitor other members-to prevent them from
becoming lazy or careless, and in other ways taking advantage of the protection provided by
their kin.*).
147. See Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the
Organizationof Exchange, 6 POPULATION DEv. REv. 1, 21-22 (1980) (discussing the possible
impacts of group size and wealth on the ability of families to successfully self-insure, and
noting the problem of risks that are positively correlated).
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families are publicly borne, the family provides a less appealing
locus for risk pooling.'"
The Type D condition combines risk with temporal cost lumps. To
the extent that the risk of a Type D event cannot be alleviated, it
exacerbates the problem of liquidity shortfalls discussed earlier. 4 9
5. Availability of FamilialExit and Nonentry
Another set of distinctions involves the degree of volition required
to form relationships upon which support obligations might be
based, and the degree of difficulty one confronts in dissolving those
relationships. To begin with the first point, familial relationships"
are formed with varying degrees of volition. Many family relationships are formed automatically upon birth (such as one's relationship with one's parents, grandparents, siblings, and so on) and are
completely nonvolitional. Marriage, adoption, and childbearing all
result from voluntary actions, although distinctions are possible
here as well.' 5 ' Familial relationships also vary in the ease with
which they may be broken. The marital bond is notoriously easy
to break. Bonds with children can be legally severed, but the law
typically makes this break quite costly and irreversible.'5 2 Bonds
with parents and other relatives are usually not severed, but they
are also not currently paired with significant support obligations in
our society. 153 Interestingly, the policy implications suggested by
148. See supra Part I.D.2.
149. See supra text accompanying note 142.
150. I use the term "relationships" here to reference the legally cognizable tie between
parties, not the qualitative, experiential and emotional bond that may (or may not) develop
between the parties. See FwEMAN, supra note 3, at 300 (discussing how law defines family
by creating or recognizing particular ties).
151. In marriage, one is choosing not only to become a spouse in the abstract, but to become
the spouse of a particular, identifiable individual with certain relatively well-defined personal
characteristics. Parent-child relationships implicate a spectrum of volitional choices. In a
nontrivial proportion of cases, people become parents not as the result of any volitional
decision to assume the role of parent, but because they engaged in sexual activity (with or
without birth control). See, e.g., TONY HONOR9, MAKING LAW BIND 127 (1987) (observing that
"it is far from the case that all children are voluntarily conceived"). Even those who
consciously choose to take on the role of parent usually have little detailed knowledge about
the personal characteristics of the child with whom they are forming a relationship.
152. See ALsTow, supra note 97, at 57, 62-63.
153. Filial support laws are still on the books in some states, but broad-based social
programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid have rendered them largely
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these distinctions are far from clear, and vary depending on
the normative goals one is seeking to achieve. Some conceptions
of fairness would evaluate the appropriateness of a particular
dependence burden based on whether the burdened person voluntarily chose to create the relationship upon which the burden is
based. Having one's fate tied to another individual with whom one
did not choose to forge an alliance can seem unfair." 4 On this view,
parental and spousal support obligations appear more fair than a
requirement that children support parents or other relatives.
A focus on behavioral distortions, however, leads to a different set
of judgments. When a choosable or breakable relationship is at
stake, dependence burdens might be expected to result in fewer
bonds of that type, other things equal. Distortions in the number of
relationships formed and broken will obviously be minimized if
dependence burdens are placed on those relationships that are both
involuntary and cannot be easily unchosen. However, where a legal
relationship is difficult to break, those who wish to avoid support
obligations based on that relationship still have some troubling
strategies available to them.
A tax analogy may help. Placing a tax on less elastic items makes
sense from a tax policy perspective, assuming our goal is to generate
revenue and not to change behavior. Placing a tax on elastic items
can lead to significantly different consumption patterns that do
the government no good, but that leave the individual consumers
worse off than they otherwise would be. This is a deadweight loss."s
Likewise, we might think of dependence burdens as essentially
"taxing" a relationship. Taxes placed on very "elastic" relationships
irrelevant. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 25, at 376; Lee, supra note 9, at 677-79.
154. For example, one argument against making children liable for their parents' care is

that people do not choose to have parents, whereas they do choose to be parents. See, e.g.,
DANIELS, supra note 119, at 29 ("Children did not ask to be brought into existence. Moreover,
their desire for care and their need for it, once born or adopted, cannot be the sole basis for
claiming they have 'implicitly consented' to being bound by the duty to care for their
parents."); Moskowitz, supra note 9, at 409-10 (discussing the influence of this idea in

Western legal thought); ten Broek, supra note 26, at 642 ("Presumably, there is the same
consanguinity, though perhaps not the same bond, between child and father as between father
and child, but the voluntary assumption inference cannot operate in reverse.").
155. See, e.g., SIMON JAMES & CHRISTOPHER NOES, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATiON:

PRINCIPLES, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 23 (1996-97 ed.) (presenting example in which a tax on
margarine generates excess burden by leading individuals to substitute butter).
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(those that can be easily forgone or forsaken) would be expected to
distort the demand for those relationships. Individuals would suffer
costs when they forgo or forsake relationships in which they would
otherwise be involved, but the government gains nothing as a result
-hence, a deadweight loss.
Of course, even when taxable items are perfectly inelastic, people
can still try to evade taxes. The costs they incur in doing so, and the
costs that the government incurs in countering their attempts,
generate deadweight losses that are just as real as those generated
by consumption distortions. The same is true of relationships. If a
dependence burden attaches to a relationship that one cannot exit,
one can still attempt to evade the financial responsibility that
attaches to the relationship. Alternatively, one can try to reduce
that financial responsibility by offloading costs onto the dependent person herself. Thus, while taxing relationships that are easy
to unchoose will alter the quantity of bonds of those types, taxing
relationships that are hard to exit could have an even more
worrisome effect on the quality and content of the bonds.
C. Policy Directions
Some tentative policy directions can be distilled from the
foregoing classification scheme and analysis. These are meant to be
illustrative only, and to suggest the capacity of the framework
presented here to further policy design. Context-specific analysis
would be necessary to apply any of these general prescriptive
statements to particular manifestations of dependence. In addition,
other factors not explored in depth here, such as the ease of
administering various sorts of rules, or the symbolic or normreinforcing values associated with a particular cost allocation
scheme, would also bear on the desirability of particular policy
options. Nevertheless, these preliminary points emphasize the
necessity of considering the full range of potential familial reactions
to dependence burdens in setting policy, and offer some ideas about
how society might begin to design policy with those familial
responses in mind.
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1. HarnessingFamily Advantages
One important theme of the analysis has been that families have
a comparative advantage with regard to certain kinds of dependence
cost-reduction actions. However, these advantages do not exist in
equal measure for all kinds of dependence. When dependence
conditions are hard to verify, when resolution or prevention of them
lies within human control, and when families are in a position to
choose the less costly of alternative care arrangements, the case for
directly involving the family in dependence care is heightened.' In
contrast, when families have little or no capacity to reduce dependence costs through their actions, placing dependence burdens on the
family does not generate cost savings of this sort.
The fact that families have few or no opportunities to reduce
dependence costs does not necessarily mean that the family is an
inferior bearer of dependence costs. Placing the burden on the
family may produce desirable distributive results, or may reduce
administrative costs associated with the system. However, if
families have access to some of the negative strategies discussed
earlier, the potential impacts of those strategies must be considered
in deciding whether assigning dependence costs to families makes
sense.
2. Altering the Relative Attractiveness of "Good"and "Bad"
Strategies
Where families do have a comparative advantage in controlling
dependence costs, they may resort to the "bad" (cost-shifting)
strategies rather than to the "good" (cost-saving) ones, if the bad
strategies produce cost savings more cheaply. In addition to the
deadweight losses associated with cost-shifting behaviors, there are
some potentially troubling interfamilial and intrafamilial distributive results. For example, some family members may be deterred by
156. This does not mean, however, that families will not resort to some of the harmful costshifting measures outlined above. Even when costs are left on the family in an effort to
harness familial advantages, policy interventions may be necessary to make the "good" costreducing alternatives more attractive than the counterproductive cost-shifting options.
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norms, altruism, or other factors from taking advantage of socially
costly strategies, such as exit from the family, while others take
advantage of those strategies. Given society's commitment to gapfilling support, exemplary individuals must not only bear the costs
associated with their own family members' dependence, but must
collectively bear the dependence costs of the erstwhile family
members of their less-exemplary counterparts. This amounts to
something like a tax on one's conscience, or on family loyalty.
Society might resolve this problem by simply providing categorical support. If this is not an attractive option for other reasons,
there may be a role for policy in altering the relative attractiveness
of the positive and negative strategies. For example, if exit from the
circle of support is a serious concern, then the cost of exit could be
raised by conditioning other benefits upon staying in the relationship. This already occurs to some extent with marriage, in which a
bundle of legal and social advantages accompanies the alliance, increasing the costs associated with breaking the bond. Policymakers
might experiment with allowing people to form other sorts of
voluntary alliances that provide a bundled mix of benefits and care
obligations.
3. DisaggregatingLiquidity from Public Assistance
Another recurrent theme has been the importance of making
appropriate, and appropriately timed, investments in human
capital. Dependence care is deeply intertwined with questions about
the development of human capital-whether that of the dependent
person, the caretaker, or both. These concerns have figured at least
implicitly in many calls for greater government support of dependence care. Yet, where human capital is at stake, the problem is not
so much about the funding of dependence care itself, but rather
about access to the necessary liquidity to carry out a particular plan
of investment concurrently with dependence care responsibilities.
Too often, policy discussions fail to emphasize the importance of
liquidity itself in remedying the problems that can result from
allocating dependence care to families.
Providing additional liquidity in the form of loans, rather than
direct grants, can preserve incentives for optimal decision making
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on the part of families while minimizing the chance that families
will resort to tactics that sabotage the development of human
capital. In other words, sufficiently attractive loans would offer a
way of harnessing the comparative advantages of families, while
offering some protection against the more pernicious manifestations
of family cost-shifting strategies. Loans offer a particularly attractive solution when the decision at issue has consequences that
are ambiguous-such as the decision to have a child. Additional
liquidity facilitates investments in the child's human capital, thus
increasing the chances that the child will grow up to be a productive
member of society. A loan, however, would have a much smaller
impact on incentives to bear children than would a direct grant.
To be sure, an implicit subsidy would be built into any loan
program that offered terms more attractive than those available on
the open market, or that took on risks that ordinary markets would
not accept. Yet, such implicit subsidies are also built into government loans for things like higher education and home mortgages,
and usually are not thought to be particularly problematic. At any
rate, the much smaller subsidy associated with a loan program
would perform better at preserving familial incentives in areas
where they play the largest role than would a direct grant.
4. Recognizing the Potentialof PublicRisk Pooling
The entire social welfare system is, in some sense, about controlling certain kinds of risks. Where losses are controllable or difficult
to verify, the prospects for market-based insurance dip, but so too
does the attractiveness of the public funding of dependence care.
However, a special niche for government risk pooling exists with
respect to risks that are predictable, but not controllable or difficult
to verify. By mandating participation in a society-wide (or population segment-wide) risk pool, government can avoid adverse
7
selection problems that would plague private insurers.1
Controllable and difficult to verify conditions present undeniable
policy challenges. Here, however, it would be possible for government to experiment with some of the tools that private insurers
157. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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have used successfully to control information and moral hazard
problems. Alternatively, government could support risk pooling
among those who are in a better position to control and verify
losses-family and friends. To draw together several of the ideas
mentioned above, a program might encourage groups of family and
friends to voluntarily form for purposes of pooling risk. This risk
pooling could be bundled with incentives for the group, such as easy
access to loans58 or tax breaks. 59 Group members then would be
liable for any losses sustained by other group members. By giving
the group a tangible stake in the success of each member, such
pooling arrangements might be expected to capitalize on social
norms'16 and build solidarity.' 8 ' Exit from the group would be
possible, but would come at the price of repaying one's share of any
loans or tax benefits received through the program, and forgoing the
benefits of future group membership.
D. Some Complications
This Article has focused almost exclusively on the family. The
other players in the dependence drama-principally society and
dependent individuals-have been relegated to cameo appearances.
It goes without saying that these parties, too, can engage in a
variety of strategies designed to reduce and off-load dependence
costs. While a comprehensive study of the interactions of all parties
158. By making members of the group jointly liable for loan repayment, financial
institutions or government lenders could capitalize on the same kinds of internal group

dynamics that have generated success in informal rotating credit arrangements. See, e.g.,
Cao, supra note 86, at 919-20 (describing how lending methods that rely on joint liability for
repayment, such as the model employed by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, conceptually
resemble rotating credit arrangements used by close-knit groups); Levinson, supra note 86,
at 395-98 (discussing microcredit institutions and the advantages of group lending).
159. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 143, at 146 (discussing the potential for the state to
subsidize cooperation by offering tax advantages or other sorts of legal advantages to families
and other cooperative groups). But see id. at 147 (noting the potential for perverse results).

160. Cf. Cao, supra note 86, at 883-84 (discussing use of informal intragroup pressures to
enforce loan repayment obligations in rotating credit associations).
161. Cf. Levinson, supra note 86, at 386 (observing that "[bly motivating groups to create
and strengthen mechanisms for cooperating, collective sanctions build group solidarity"). But

cf. id. at 386-91 (discussing two potentially problematic side effects of solidarity-the misuse
of control over group members, and a greater ability to pursue collective ends that may be

normatively problematic).
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is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting a few places
where the analysis I have presented is complicated by the preferences and reactions of the other parties.
1. Individualsand Families
One potential advantage of leaving certain kinds of dependence
costs on the family relates to the incentive effects of tightening
the connection between familial actions and familial burdens.
Those families who make cost-reducing choices are "rewarded" with
lower dependence care burdens, the argument runs, while those
who fail to make those choices are "punished" with higher dependence care burdens. But even though families may be better situated
informationally and motivationally than is society at large, currently or potentially dependent individuals can make choices that
affect their own dependence. This generates a potential disconnect
between familial actions and resulting dependence costs.
In some cases, families that have made all the right choices will
nonetheless experience high dependence burdens due to the actions
of the dependent person, while in other cases, families that have
done little or nothing to influence dependence costs will be relieved
of them through the industry and choices of the dependent person. 6 2
Here we see a place where considerations of equity and efficiency
may point in opposite directions. Harnessing the advantages of the
family in cost-reduction efforts may be impossible without leaving
families to suffer differential impacts that result from the independent choices of dependents or potential dependents.
Dependent individuals also have preferences of their own. While
some of the analysis above has considered the degree to which the
family would serve as faithful agents for the interests of the
dependent individuals, there is also the simple question of where
the dependent person would prefer to have her care come from. For
162. Dependence burdens also are impacted by good and bad luck, which introduces a
further disconnect between inputs and results. The tendency of individuals to attribute good
outcomes to their own skill and bad outcomes to bad luck, see, e.g., ERIC VAN DEN STEEN,
SKILL OR LUCK? BIASES OF RATIONAL AGENTS 1 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
4255-02, June 2002), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=319972 (discussing
literature suggesting that "[pleople tend to attribute success to their own skills and failures
to bad luck"), complicates the question of personal agency in influencing dependence costs.
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example, it is possible that an elderly person will feel more "independent" when receiving government assistance than she would
when receiving family assistance."6 Any system that requires family
members to look to each other for support will operate in some
tension with principles of personal autonomy.' No account of the
allocation of dependence burdens can ignore the impact of the
preferences and behavior of the dependent individual herself.
2. Society Plays Games, Too
The analysis above portrayed society as an essentially benevolent and unified entity that is capable of speaking with one voice
and pursuing policy objectives rationally and systematically. That
portrayal was a helpful simplification for purposes of fleshing out
the familial responses to dependence burdens, but it falls short of a
full account in at least two important ways.
First, society's decision-making apparatus is under the control of
a confusion of competing interests. An analysis of the allocation of
dependence burdens must contend with the reality of rent seeking,
which generates deadweight losses as different groups within
society attempt to win transfers for themselves.' The possibility of
163. See, e.g., Dora L. Costa, Displacing the Family: Union Army Pensions and Elderly
Living Arrangements, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1269 (1997) (using data on Union Army pensions to

examine preferences for independent living over family living); see also DORA L. COSTA, THE
EVOLUTION OF RETIMENT. AN AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1880-1990, at 106-32 (1998)

(relating recent trends in elderly living arrangements to her findings); Ellickson, supranote
70,

at 36 (discussing Costa's findings and demographic changes in elderly living

arrangements); Moskowitz, supra note 9, at 410 (observing that elderly people value their
autonomy and may "actually prefer professionals or third parties to provide needed support"
rather than their children).
164. See GLENDON, supra note 7, at 296 (noting that avoidance of economic dependence on
relatives was among the goals of the Social Democratic Party in Sweden); Persky, supranote

52, at 187 (explaining that the "acceptance by classical economists of the family as an
instrument for coping with dependency sits uneasily with core liberal principles, which
emphasize the right of individuals to determine their own destinies"); see also Michael G.
Peletz, Ambivalence in Kinship Since the 1940s, in RELATIVE VALUES: RECONFIGURING
KINSHIP STUDIES 413 (Sarah Franklin & Susan McKinnon eds., 2001) (discussing mixed
feelings towards kinship that emerge from kinship studies).
165. See Robert D. Toflison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A
HANDBOOK 506 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) ("Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of
wealth transfers.*); see also FOLBRE, supra note 7, at 116 (describing rent-seeking behavior
in the context of welfare state policies).
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generational interest groups presents a special concern."
If
differential treatment of different age groups holds constant over
time, all people can expect to spend some portion of their lives
receiving favored treatment. 167 It is possible, however, that changes
in demographics or other factors could cause shifts in the differential treatment of different age groups, creating unfairness for
particular generational cohorts.16
Second, at the level of politics, the allocation of dependence
burdens cannot be untangled from other questions about the
distribution of income and wealth. Placing dependence burdens on
families tends to entrench existing interfamilial resource inequalities. In contrast, placing dependence burdens on society under a
progressive tax system that uses income or wealth as its base would
have a broadly redistributive effect. While these varying distributive implications might matter little in an idealized world where
any desired distributive goal can be achieved separately through
a frictionless tax and transfer system, they play an important,
perhaps decisive, role in the real world. Later "settling up" of
distributive infelicities wrought by other parts of law and policy is
at worst impossible, and at best extraordinarily costly.
Of course, a categorical redistributive program based on some
criterion other than wealth or income does a much worse job of
focusing assistance on the poor than would an idealized tax and
transfer system. Hence, if the true goal is to help the poor, it might
seem that we would want to design a program that does just that,
166. But see POSNER, supra note 5, at 48 (arguing that "Itlhe widespread belief that the
elderly constitute a selfish voting bloc which is distorting the optimal functioning of
democratic government is exaggerated").
167. See DANIELS, supra note 119, at 41:
If we treat the young one way and the old another, then over time, each person
is treated both ways. The advantages (or disadvantages) of consistent
differential treatment by age will equalize over time. An institution that treats
the young and the old differently will, over time, still treat people equally.
Id.; see also Becker & Murphy, supra note 94, at 10-12 (showing how any apparent
disproportionality in expenditures for the elderly disappears when one considers the earnings
stream over the life cycle).
168. See POSNxR, supra note 5, at 48 (considering the possibility that today's transfers from
young to old "may actually reduce the probability of generous transfers to today's young when
they are old by increasing the federal government's budget deficit and reducing the rate of
economic growth,* and "may engender resentment of, and political opposition to, future
transfers to the old").
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rather than a program that delivers benefits to both the well-off and
the poor.'69 This misapprehends the choice situation, however.
Society does not begin with a sack of money that it can use in any
way it wishes to help the poor, so that the task is simply to find the
most efficient way of getting money out of the sack and into the
pockets of poor people. 7 ' Instead, the amount of redistribution that
society realistically can accomplish depends crucially on how it goes
about doing it.' Experience suggests that it is politically harder to
redistribute from the wealthy to the poor than it is to redistribute
to some group that shares a characteristic other than wealth-such
as family status or work history. If a program can manage to
address the leading causes of poverty without addressing the poor
as such, it is likely to increase the total amount of resources flowing
to the poor.'72
To put the point slightly differently, I have been assuming for
purposes of this Article that our goal is to find the best way of
allocating dependence burdens, not the best way to redistribute
wealth. But if one has normative commitments to improving
circumstances for the less well-off, then the potential for using a
program aimed at squaring up dependence burdens to pursue other
distributive goals cannot be ignored.

169. See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, CoLLEcT
AcTIONAND THE DiSTItION OF INCOME:
A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 186 (1969) (discussing the criterion of "vertical efficiency-the
extent to which assistance meant to help the poor achieves that goal). Weisbrod discusses the
example of subsidized higher education, which is often lauded as a measure that helps the

poor, but which actually "performs rather badly by the vertical efficiency criterion" because
students who take advantage of the subsidy are more likely to come from high-income families
than from low-income families. Id.

170. See ALSOTT, supra note 97, at 135-36; Steven Kelman, A Casefor In-Kind Transfers,
2 ECON. & PHIL 55, 57-59 (1986).

171. See, e.g., ALMso'rr, supra note 97, at 136 (explaining that "a universal program may
be more popular, and disproportionately better-funded, than an income-tested one"); Fennell,
supranote 11, at 320-24 (discussing and citing literature on this point).
172. The resulting redistribution is also less stigmatizing for the poor than is relief that is

narrowly focused on the poor. See, e.g., KrrrAY, supra note 2, at 117-18 (discussing the stigma
associated with welfare, which is arguably attributable to the narrow group it targets);
WEISBROD, supra note 169, at 194 (discussing 'the conflict between the criteria of nondemeaning benefits and of vertical target efficiency"); Fennell, supra note 11, at 323-24
(discussing and citing literature on this point).
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CONCLUSION

My goal in this Article has been to present a new structure for
thinking about dependence burdens that could facilitate more
fruitful dialogue on the topic--especially between people approaching the topic from different normative perspectives. Recognizing the
existing constraints on societal choice and the family strategies that
unfold against that backdrop provides a way of framing the problem
that can be applied cross-contextually. This approach also highlights
both the distributive and the efficiency implications of dependence
choices. As the complications raised at the end suggest, this Article
does not offer a neatly tied package of policy prescriptions. The
policy ideas drawn from this Article's refraining of the problem are
only tentative ones, meant to suggest possible directions for further
work. I hope that by clarifying certain aspects of the problem, this
Article has shed sufficient new light on this important set of issues
to generate renewed interest and innovation in this area.

